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Thirty Years after the Iranian Revolution: 
Islam, Democracy and the Crisis of 
Legitimacy
The 2009 presidential election in Iran marks an epoch 
not only in Iranian history  but in the Middle East  as 
whole. For the first time after the 1979 revolution, the 
three defeated candidates wi th extensive 
revolutionary credentials openly challenged the 
validity  of the election, accusing the government of 
massive fraud that had resulted in the reelection of 
the incumbent president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. To 
be sure, the previous election (2005) was not  entirely 
devoid of controversy as the candidate Mehdi 
Karrubi had leveled fraud accusations against the 
government, but the controversy was little more than 
ephemeral and posed no serious challenge to the 
government’s authority. However, the latest 
allegations and the ensuing protests in Tehran and 
other major cities struck an unprecedented blow to 
the legitimacy  of the entire political system, which 
has over the  past three decades relied on people’s 
votes to meet the exigencies of a republic. 
While the protests started with a simple slogan
—“where is my vote?”—they ostensibly targeted 
more than a seemingly fraudulent election. Indeed 
they called into question the legitimacy of a 
government that could no longer be trusted with 
safeguarding people’s rights and interests. The 2009 
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presidential election has thus uncovered inner 
conflicts that had long lain dormant  in the 
foundations of the Iranian political system—conflicts 
that raised serious questions about the extent to which 
ideological and factional interests could take 
precedence over both democratic principles and 
Islamic ideals of governance.
More importantly, the 2009 election has induced the 
emergence of the Iranian Green Movement as a 
broad-based platform for a host of social, economic, 
and political demands. The Green Movement’s 
strength lies in its pluralistic character and its 
nonviolent strategy. While the unfettered violence, 
perpetrated by the Iranian government and its militia 
surrogates, has helped curb the eruption of street 
protests, the Green Movement seems to have retained 
its vast potentials for mobilizing political forces 
within Iranian society.
The Movement’s leadership—consisting of the two 
defeated candidates, Mir Hossein Moussavi and 
Mehdi Karroubi, plus the former president 
Mohammad Khatami—has emphasized time and 
again that a viable solution to the current crisis must 
be sought within the framework of the Iranian 
constitution, which embraces both Islamic principles 
and democratic procedures. Yet the government’s 
denial of any political crisis as well as its interest in 
putting the Movement’s leader on trial has dashed any 
hopes for a reconciliatory rapprochement. Many of 
the Green Movement’s supporters, on the other hand, 
feel strongly  about the government’s violent 
crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, its torture 
and killing of political dissidents, and its utter 
disregard of the citizens’ civil rights, which in turn 
has rendered any compromise ineffective.
It is hard to predict the outcome of the current 
deadlock. It is clear, however, that the Green 
Movement will continue to serve as a platform for a 
variety of public demands. This issue of the 
Sociology  of Islam and Muslim Societies Newsletter 
provides insight into this political crisis. A number of 
scholars and specialists of Iranian contemporary 
politics offer their analyses on the current state of 
affairs and the future prospects of change in Iran. The 
Newsletter’s editors hope that the six articles and one 
interview in this issue will contribute to a better 
understanding of the ongoing crisis in Iran.
Tugrul Keskin
Najm al-Din Yousefi
Special	   thanks	   to	   SASAN AFSOOSI who let the 
Sociology  of Islam and Muslim Societies use his 
wonderful photos. Sasan’s photos represent the real 
Iran from an insider’s perspective, not an Orientalist 
approach.    For more information:
Photojournalist | TV Producer | Iran Media Consultant
M 703 862 7642 | F 703 764 2048 | Email 
safsoosi@gmail.com
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Reflections on Democracy, Non-Violence 
and Political Change in Iran
Nader Hashemi
Assistant Professor of Middle East and Islamic 
Politics, 
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, 
University of Denver
Nader.Hashemi@du.edu 
Struggles for democracy generally require three 
critical ingredients for success: effective and 
incorruptible leadership, a strategy for mass 
mobilization and a sense of hope that engenders 
sacrifice.  Last year at  this time, none of these existed 
in Iran. The clerical oligarchy was firmly in control, 
the Reform movement was in disarray and political 
apathy reigned supreme. Today, eight months after 
the disputed presidential election, all three key 
ingredients are now firmly in place.  Defying 
expectations, Iran’s Green Movement (Jonbesh-e 
Sabz-e Iran) soldiers on in the face of an authoritarian 
regime whose brutal suppression has failed to 
intimidate or subdue it.  Whether this movement will 
be triumphant is unknown but what is clear is that an 
indigenous movement for democracy has delivered a 
major blow to the Islamic Republic: Iranian politics 
henceforth will never be the same.  How did these 
three elements come together?
Understanding the origins and the defiant  posture of 
the leadership  of the Green Movement requires 
returning to an event in August 2000 that marked a 
critical denouement for the reformist-conservative 
struggle in Iran.  At  this time, the Reform Movement 
was in its prime, winning landslide elections at the 
presidential, municipal and most  recently the 
parliamentary  level.  Hope for democratic change was 
in the air as Reformers captured all of the key 
democratically-contested institutions of the state in 
quick succession, to the shock and bewilderment of 
their conservative rivals.
The first item on the legislative agenda of reform-
dominated 6th parliament (2000-2004) was to 
overturn an illiberal press law passed in the final days 
of the outgoing hard-line parliament.  The print media 
in Iran had flourished during President Khatami’s 
first term and quickly became a bastion of support for 
pro-democracy  activists.  Courageous journalists and 
editors were breaking political taboos by  transcending 
the narrow ideological confines of Iran’s post-
revolutionary  elite consensus. A public sphere was 
created whereby Iranian society was in full scale 
debate – to the mortification of the ruling clerical 
establishment – about the relationship between 
tradition and modernity, religion and democracy and 
the moral basis of legitimate political authority. 
Nader Hashemi
As parliamentary  debate on the press law began with 
the eyes of the nation upon it, the speaker suddenly 
intervened to halt the proceedings.  He announced 
that he had just received an important summons from 
the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei demanding that 
the existing (illiberal) press law not be revised and 
that all debate in on this topic cease immediately. 
Khamenei’s letter – which angry MPs forced the 
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[4]
speaker to read into the parliamentary record – 
specifically warned that “should the enemies of 
Islam, the revolution and the Islamic system take over 
or infiltrate the press, a great danger would threaten 
the security, unity  and the faith of the people….The 
current [press] law … has been able to prevent the 
appearance of this great calamity, and [therefore], its 
amendment and similar actions that have been 
anticipated by the parliamentary  committee are not 
legitimate and not  in the interest of the country and 
the system.”(1) 
 Scuffles and fistfights broke out among rival 
members of parliament.  Several deputies walked out 
in protest  as chaos soon enveloped the parliamentary 
chamber. The speaker tried to restore calm by 
reminding everyone that the Supreme Leader’s 
actions were legally  permissible.  “Our constitution 
has the elements of the absolute rule of the supreme 
clerical leader [velayat-i motlaq faqih] and you all 
know this and approve of this.  We are all duty-bound 
to abide by it.”(2)  The speaker at the time was Mehdi 
Karoubi, a 2009 Reformist presidential candidate and 
today  one of the courageous leaders of the Green 
Movement, famous for exposing a policy of 
systematic rape in Iranian prisons.  His defiance of 
Khamenei today, in contrast to his deference nine 
years ago, is worth noting.
 After the June 2009 election, and following a 
week of demonstrations that brought three million 
people into the streets of Tehran, Khamenei delivered 
his much anticipated Friday sermon. He publicly 
endorsed Ahmadinejad as president, declared the 
election to be free and fair on balance and then went a 
step further. Similar to his August 2000 intervention, 
he forcefully demanded a halt to all debate on the 
topic, declaring the issue resolved while threatening 
the opposition with violence if their defiance 
persisted.  This time, however, the senior leadership 
of the reform movement stood firm and boldly  defied 
the explicit wishes of the Supreme Leader.  This 
marked a critical turning point  in the relationship 
between reformers and the Islamic Republican 
establishment. Their disobedience inspired millions 
of Iranians and provided Iran’s democratic forces 
with the internal leadership  it desperately sought and 
previously lacked.
 By all measures, the leadership of the Green 
Movement comprised of the troika of Mir Hossein 
Mousavi (former Prime Minister), Mehdi Karoubi 
(former Speaker of Parliament) and Muhammad 
Khatami (former President), can be characterized as 
relatively mild and measured in their speeches and 
political statements.  All remain loyal to the Islamic 
Republic, its current constitution and the political 
theology of Ayatullah Khomeini, albeit emphasizing a 
democratic and humanistic reading of this legacy. 
Nonetheless, despite repeated warnings from the 
Supreme Leader and a growing chorus of hard-line 
opinion demanding their arrest – and more recently 
their execution – the leadership continues its defiance 
of established power and its steadfast support for the 
civil and human rights of their fellow citizens.  The 
future of the Green Movement and any hope for an 
eventual democratic transition in Iran will be 
dependent on the ongoing resistance of these leaders.
 The strategy  of mass mobilization and street 
protests has at best a tenuous link to Iran’s Green 
leadership.  It has been accurately  reported that 
leaders are responding to and being led by  society 
and not the opposite. In his most recent statement to 
the nation, (No. 17, January 1, 2010), Mousavi 
explicitly acknowledged the point that protests are 
occurring not because he has called people into the 
streets but rather due to the prevalence of 
“widespread social and civil networks that were 
formed during and after the election through the 
people themselves and which continue to self 
generate.”(3) This fascinating development suggests 
the extent to which the Green Movement has 
penetrated key sectors of Iranian society based on the 
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existence of underground networks of activists 
scattered in major cities who rely on the internet and 
mobile phone technology  to spread their message. 
This also explains why the movement has been hard 
to crush, notwithstanding the best  efforts of the 
regime. 
 And finally  there is the issue of hope. In a 
recent in-depth report on the state of human rights 
Iran after the June election, Amnesty  International 
noted that  “human rights violations in Iran are now as 
bad as at any time in the past 20 years.”(4) To date, 
the Islamic Republic has imprisoned almost every 
leading opposition figure, human and civil rights 
activist, student leader and dissident journalist. In 
fact, it is hard to think of the name of prominent 
Iranian pro-democracy  activist that the regime has not 
arrested.  In its desperation, it  even picked up the 
sister of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shireen Ebadi, 
an apolitical figure, with the sole intention of 
intimidating her more famous sibling. 
 Yet notwi ths tanding th is repress ive 
atmosphere replete with show trials, torture, rape, 
death and threats of mass executions, Iranians who 
sympathize with the Green Movement today  are 
experiencing a deep sense of hope, cautious optimism 
and at times exhilaration about the prospects of a 
better future. There is a general appreciation that a 
transition to democracy will not emerge without 
significant sacrifice and a long-term commitment to 
oppositional activity. A rejection of violent revolution 
and a commitment to a strategy  of nonviolence 
resistance by necessity demands patience, prudence 
and time. In the words of Columbia University 
Professor Hamid Dabashi:  “This is not sprint but a 
marathon.” 
 A realization that there are no quick fixes to 
the problem of political authoritarianism in Iran is 
informed by the fact that  the Iranian regime, despite 
being shaken and confused, remains firmly  in control 
of the key  institutions of violence, the administration 
of justice and economic production (largely  oil). 
Evidence that this control has weakened is shaky  at 
best.  Moreover, the Iranian regime, in part due to its 
control over the media, retains significant support in 
rural and poorer areas of the country including a core 
group of loyal devotees who dominate the upper 
echelons of the security  forces, many of whom 
believe that Ali Khamenei is God’s representative on 
earth.  
 The next stage of confrontation is set for early 
summer. Expectations are for a similar repetition of 
defiant street protests, a harsh government crackdown 
and then a wave of mass arrests.  Meanwhile Iran’s 
Green Movement continues its nonviolent resistance. 
Its future success will depend on whether the three 
key ingredients for democratic change – effective 
leadership, a strategy for mass mobilization and hope 
– remain in place and grow stronger with time. 
Nader Hashemi teaches Middle East and Islamic 
Politics at the Josef Korbel School of International 
Affairs at the University of Denver. He is the author 
of Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward 
a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies (Oxford 
University Press, 2009)
NOTES:
1) The full text of Khamenehi’s letter appeared in Hamshahri 
(Tehran), 7 August 2000.
2) Nazila Fathi, “Iranian Leader Bars Press Bill of Reform Bloc,” 
New York Times, 7 August 2000.
3) Statement No. 17 (January 1, 2010) taken from Mir Hossein 
Mousavi’s Official Website: http://www.kaleme.org/1388/10/11/
klm-7047 (translation is mine).
4) I’m quoting from the press release available at: http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/post-election-
iran-violations-among-worst-20-years-20091210. The full 
report’s uses identical language and is accessible at: http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/123/2009/en/
1e69a8fb-dcf1-4165-a7fc-a94369e364bf/mde131232009en.pdf
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Counter-Revolution and Revolt in Iran
An Interview with Iranian Political 
Scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh
By Danny Postel
Author, Reading "Legitimation Crisis" in Tehran
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?
mode=synopsis&bookkey=211444 




Hossein Bashiriyeh is one of 
post-revolutionary Iran’s key 
political thinkers. Known as the 
father of political sociology in 
Iran, he has influenced, through 
his voluminous writings and his 
24 years teaching political 
science at the University of 
Tehran (1983-2007), both the 
study and practice of politics in 
Iran.
In his recent book Iran’s 
Intellectual Revolution, Mehran Kamrava describes 
Bashiriyeh as “one of the country’s most influential 
and most serious thinkers and analysts.” Bashiriyeh’s 
two and a half decades as a scholar and mentor in Iran, 
Kamrava writes
have left indelible marks on successive generations of 
political science graduates, many of whom have gone 
on to become academics themselves or have secured 
policy-making positions in the state bureaucracy.(1)
Bashiriyeh has figured critically  in Iranian public life, 
says Ali Mirsepassi, author of Intellectual Discourse 
and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating 
Modernity in Iran, by “introducing democratic 
theories and ideas to a generation of Iranian 
intellectuals and political figures who latter played 
significant roles in the democratic and reform 
movement.”(2)
Sadly for those of us not literate in Persian, only  one 
of his numerous books is available in English: the 
monumental State and Revolution in Iran, a largely 
Gramscian analysis of the Iranian Revolution 
published in 1984 — alas, long out of print and 
extremely difficult to find (only  a single used copy is 
available via Amazon and not one via Powell’s). (3)
His books in Persian include Revolution and Political 
Mobilization (1991), Political Sociology (1993), 
History of Political Thought in the 20th Century 
[Volume I, Marxist Thought, Volume II, Liberal and 
Conservative Thought] (1994-96), The Kingdom of 
Reason (1993), Civil Society and Political 
Development in Iran (1998), New Theories in Political 
Science (1999), Sociology of Modernity (1999), The 
State and Civil Society (2000), 20th Century Theories 
of Culture (2000), Obstacles to Political Development 
in Iran (2001), Lessons on Democracy for Everyone 
(2001), Political Science for Everyone (2001), An 
Introduction to the Political Sociology of Iran: The 
Era of the Islamic Republic (2002), and Transition to 
Democracy: Theoretical Issues (2006).
His translations from English to Persian include 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, Barrington Moore’s Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Hubert 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow’s Michel Foucault, Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, and Robert Holub’s 
Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere.(4)
Among the subjects Bashiriyeh explores in his 2003 
essay collection Reason in Politics are the Frankfurt 
School, liberalism and anarchism, Weber and Islam, 
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and class struggles, political ideology and identity-
building after the Iranian Revolution. 
In the summer of 2007 Bashiriyeh was fired from the 
University  of Tehran (the handiwork of the “Committee 
of Cultural Revolution and Purges of Universities”). 
(5) The previous year, President Ahmadinejad had 
challenged Iran’s university  students to “scream” and 
ask, “Why are there liberal and secular professors in 
universities?”(6)  
Bashiriyeh has since taken a position in the Department 
of Political Science at Syracuse University, where he 
teaches courses on Middle Eastern Political Systems, 
Islamic Political Thought, Social Theory and the 
Middle East, the Politics of Modern Iran and 
Comparative Revolutions.
The following interview was conducted via e-mail 
between June and August of 2009.
Danny Postel: As the author of a classic study  of the 
Iranian Revolution (The State and Revolution in Iran), 
and given your recent comparative work on 
“transitional situations,” what are your impressions of 
what’s been happening in Iran in the aftermath of the 
June 12 presidential election?2 Some have argued that 
we are witnessing “a great emancipatory event” (Slavoj 
Žižek)(7); “something quite extraordinary, perhaps 
even a social revolution” (Hamid Dabashi); a “velvet 
coup” (Anoush Ehteshami); “the final acts of a 
protracted war for the control of the Iranian 
economy” (Behzad Yaghmaian); even an attempt to 
abolish the people (Pepe Escobar).(8) How would you 
characterize the situation?
Hossein Bashiriyeh: I think that  the aftermath of the 
election constituted a catalyst for a potentially 
revolutionary  situation facing a government caught in a 
number of crises. More specifically, it has signified a 
fatal crisis of cohesion and unity. Of course the 
basically  authoritarian electoral theocracy had been 
more or less experiencing a number of crises, affecting 
its bases of power: ideological-authoritarian regimes, 
generally  speaking, may develop crises in the sphere of 
their ideological legitimacy, administrative efficiency, 
internal elite cohesion, and coercive capacity. If all 
these crises occur at the same time, the situation may be 
described as revolutionary; out of these crises emerge 
the necessary ingredients for a political opposition too, 
i.e. mass discontent, ideology, leadership and 
organization.
So for a revolutionary situation to develop  at least eight 
factors are required: the four regime factors (crises) and 
the four revolutionary-movement factors. Obviously  all 
these factors are dialectically interrelated and enhance 
each other. In the case of the Iranian regime before the 
election, I would say that a considerable degree of the 
first two crises had already  come about, but the crisis of 
unity  and cohesion had been contained since 2004, and 
there was no crisis of coercion or domination at  all. I 
think that the aftermath of the election signified a quite 
unprecedented crisis of elite cohesion and unity, further 
intensifying the crises of legitimacy and efficiency. 
Never before had an internal rift  caused such a large-
scale mass mobilization of opposition.
In the specific case of the Iranian regime, a more or less 
chronic crisis of legitimacy had been caused by  a 
number of factors and developments. Four major 
causes can be identified: (1) the rise of a more 
republican interpretation of the dominant  Islamist 
ideology; (2) the contradictory nature of the 
Constitution, in terms of seeking to combine theocratic 
and democratic principles of legitimacy; (3) an 
increasingly noticeable gap between ruling-class 
practice and its legitimizing ideals; and (4) a widening 
gap between public opinion and official ideology as a 
result of the increasing secularization of social values 
and attitudes. In any  case even if the elected offices 
may be said to be periodically legitimized by popular 
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elections (although elections are controlled), the 
unelected offices are no doubt subject to an erosion of 
legitimacy  as a result of the four factors I’ve outlined. 
As I will explain later, I think the grave crisis of 
cohesion and unity  resulting from the June election 
has also actualized the underlying crisis of legitimacy.
In terms of a crisis of efficient management, I would 
argue that the Islamist government has suffered from a 
chronic crisis of efficiency  throughout its rule; the 
more recent intensification of the crisis since 2005 has 
resulted from irregular and erratic economic policies 
and practices, political nepotism and general 
mismanagement. The adoption of a politically useful 
discourse of alms-based Islamic welfare policy by  the 
Fundamentalist faction in power has, according to 
expert views, caused economic disruption, inflation, 
recession and more unemployment. Irregular 
redistributive policies, price intervention, and a 
reduction in interest rates have contributed to the 
critical situation. Obviously in the absence of a crisis 
of cohesion and elite unity, economic problems may 
have no political outcomes, but as rifts develop within 
the regime, they may  expand the possibility of 
political mobilization by  opposition forces. However, 
in the actual mass political mobilization in the 
aftermath of the election, the motivating force was not 
the economic conditions, but rather what I consider to 
be a sense of political frustration and inefficacy 
mainly on the part of the urban middle classes, who 
found their vote and their political participation to be 
of no consequence in changing the political situation. 
The mass mobilization resulted from a gap between 
rising political expectations and the outcome of the 
election — a gap which has become very intolerable 
indeed.
But the real meaning of the aftermath of the June 
election seems to me to lie in the unprecedented 
intensification of a crisis of cohesion and unity. Such a 
crisis had emerged and persisted in the 1980s under 
Ayatollah Khomeini himself. But as mentioned, never 
before 2009 had internal divisions led to such a mass 
political mobilization and massive repression. From 
the beginning, the Islamic state witnessed internal 
divisions over economic policy, the interpretation of 
Islamic law, emphasis on the Islamic vs. republican 
nature of the Constitution, and so on. In the 1980s two 
parties emerged: the Party  of Tradition and the Party 
of Khomeinists; the former supported non-
intervention in economic affairs and a traditionalist 
jurisprudence; the latter advocated economic 
intervention and redistribution, as well as a dynamic 
jurisprudence — but this division was contained as a 
result of Khomeini’s arbitration.
Then in the early 1990s a new division emerged 
within the Party of Islamic Tradition itself, as the 
ruling elite under Rafsanjani sought to modernize the 
Islamic state and to readjust it to the requirements of 
globalization. That internal division did not lead to 
popular mobilization, as the ruling elite succeeded in 
containing the rift  as an internal affair. The division 
within the ruling parties and elites was intensified 
from 1997, when the old Khomeinists came to power 
and sought to democratize the Islamic state by 
augmenting its republican aspects. That division led to 
the political activation and mobilization of new 
middle classes, the rise of new parties and violent 
confrontation. However, from 2004 the core clerical 
elite, led by the office of Leadership, sought  to 
minimize internal divisions by ousting the supporters 
of modernization and democratization from power and 
by creating new political formations and alliances, 
especially the Party of Fundamentalism (Party of 
Principles). The power bloc since 2004 has been 
occupied by an alliance of the Fundamentalist and 
Traditionalist-Conservative parties to the detriment of 
the Reformists. Given the controlled nature of popular 
elections in the country, the ruling factions have now 
sought to retain their positions by what the reformists 
regard as an electoral coup followed by repression. 
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What is meant by  an electoral coup is in fact a late 
“political abortion” or an “abortive coup” preventing 
the reformist baby from coming into life.
So on the whole I think developments since June 12 
can be understood and explained in terms of a grave 
crisis of elite cohesion and unity, which has not been 
solved by arbitration as in previous episodes, but has 
been met with violence and repression. Generally there 
is little doubt about the vital importance of internal 
divisions and opposition for change under ideological 
regimes such as the Islamic Republic, particularly  in 
the absence of any organized external opposition. 
However, the issue of disunity  has not led to a crisis of 
coercion and domination; there are no apparent rifts 
within the armed forces, no rival military force, and 
the ruling elite’s will to power and repression seems to 
be intact. But crises of cohesion cause other problems 
for ideological regimes, such as further undermining 
regime legitimacy, paving the way for the organization 
of popular discontent, and providing leadership and 
ideology, as other necessary ingredients of a 
revolutionary situation.
At any rate, the aftermath of the June election can be 
understood in terms of the intensification of internal 
divisions and polarization between ruling factions. But 
unlike previous episodes, it has led to the mobilization 
of popular opposition on a very large scale. The 
highest degree of internal division in the regime’s 
history has now been reached, causing polarization, 
confrontation, and an expanding circle of “counter-
revolution.”
DP: As you observe, never before in its 30-year 
history had the Islamic Republic seen such mass 
political mobilization. So why now, in your view?
HB: Obviously mass mobilization or the mobilization 
of a large number of people for political purposes — 
especially in a polarized form and under an 
authoritarian regime — does not come about easily or 
frequently; it is only rarely and under exceptional 
circumstances that political leaders or parties succeed 
in calling people onto the streets in huge numbers, as 
happened for a few days following the June 12 
election in Iran. Given this, we need to know what 
those exceptional circumstances and conditions that 
make mass mobilization possible are.
Since mass mobilization is a rare occurrence in the 
politics of authoritarian regimes, it follows that its 
outbreak cannot be explained by reference to 
“ordinary” situations prevailing under those regimes, 
such as economic problems and crises, government 
incapacity, general mass discontent, or political 
repression. Although these may constitute the eventual 
ingredients of the mobilization episode, the 
mobilization itself requires specific mechanisms in 
order to come about; it is through these mechanisms 
that those raw elements may be articulated. As the 
history of mass mobilization shows everywhere, the 
phenomenon is not a mechanical one, resulting from 
some “objectively” undesirable socio-economic and 
political conditions per se; it  is the “subjective” 
channeling of those objective conditions which is the 
key element.
In general, three rather complementary  theories have 
been advanced in order to explain why and how mass 
mobilization becomes possible: first the theory that 
regards mass mobilization as a rare and exceptional 
psychosocial or existential condition which results 
from the development of an intolerable gap between 
popular expectations and the possibility  of meeting 
them. From this psychosocial perspective, for 
example, persistent poverty  or persistent prosperity do 
not lead to mass action; rather it  is going from 
prosperity  to poverty  or from poverty to prosperity that 
creates the gap between expectations and the 
possibility of meeting them. According to this famous 
Davies J-Curve theory, collective action may take 
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place at the point where the gap is most intolerable. So 
the theoretical dispute and debate concerning whether it 
is abject poverty or prosperity that leads to insurrection 
is thus resolved. Another major theoretical debate has 
been going on concerning whether mass collective 
action becomes possible in a mass society or in a 
society experiencing the development of a civil society; 
this dispute is similarly  resolved in the theory of 
segmented civil society, according to which there is no 
possibility for mass political mobilization in a repressed 
mass society on the one hand, and there is no need for 
such a mobilization in a fully grown and developed 
civil society, on the other; so it  is under conditions of 
segmented civil societies that  mass mobilization of the 
type we have witnessed in Iran may come about. A 
third, political, theory relates the possibility of mass 
action and mobilization to internal ruling elite disunity. 
In the specific case of Iran in June 2009, a combination 
of these three factors made the large-scale mobilization 
of the people possible.
First, an intolerable gap  resulted from rising 
expectations before the election and violent repression 
after the election. The result was public indignation and 
anger on an unprecedented scale. Obviously the rising 
expectations were political in nature, not economic (as 
in the theory  mentioned above). For a few weeks, a 
large, mainly urban middle-class-based socio-political 
movement emerged around the two reformist 
candidates (Moussavi and Karroubi), mobilizing a large 
segment of the population in the name of the Green 
Movement for reform and change. The period of the 
electoral campaign was marked by festivities, public 
discussions and gatherings, heated debates, hopeful 
projections for change, intriguing TV debates between 
presidential candidates, popular excitement, relative 
press freedom, critique of government performance, 
political publicity  and propaganda, and the reactivation 
of political groupings and parties.
As the unexpected election results were announced, the 
atmosphere changed completely and a mood of public 
despair and anger replaced the exuberant mood of hope 
and expectation. The focus on a single issue — the 
rigging of the election — polarized the population, 
leading to mass street demonstrations against the 
manipulation of the election. The first  week after the 
election witnessed the height  of the gap mentioned 
above. The leaders of the movement were also 
successful in concentrating and focusing on the single 
issue of fraudulence. The second week, however, 
witnessed a rather different situation as the Supreme 
Leader vowed, in the Friday prayers, to suppress any 
street demonstration and endorsed the official election 
results as accurate. So on the whole the gap resulting 
from rising political expectations and hopes for 
freedom and change, on the one hand, and the anger, 
disappointment and indignation caused by the 
manipulation of the election, on the other, was the 
reason for the mass mobilizations which have had no 
precedent during the 30 years of Islamic rule in the 
country. In the weeks since, however, the sense of 
anger has been gradually  replaced by a sense of fear, as 
the security forces have shown no sign of mercy in 
ruthlessly  and violently crushing any public gathering 
or demonstration.
Regarding the second factor — the civil society vs. 
mass society  debate — I would argue that 
developments during the so-called Reconstruction 
Period from 1989 to 1997, as well as the Reform Period 
from 1997 to 2005, had to a certain degree paved the 
way for a slow transition from mass society  to a 
segmented civil society. The emergence of civil 
associations, independent student organizations, 
associations of writers and journalists, a rather 
independent press and increasing independence of arts 
and culture from government control were all signs of 
this transition from mass to civil society, albeit in a 
circumscribed way.
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A number of similar (though much more limited) 
collective actions and mass protests had already 
occurred during the Reconstruction and Reform periods 
(like the uprisings in Islamshahr, Qazvin, Mashad and 
the 1999 Student Uprising, known as 18 Tir), but the 
recent mass mobilization was very different in nature, 
scope, intensity of government reaction, and 
particularly in terms of its consequences in disclosing 
the real character of the political system for the 
majority  of the people. The violent confrontation took 
place on a mass scale; the lines of division between the 
government and the public opposition were clearly 
drawn; and a state of disillusion came about. On the 
other hand, it seems that the civil-society  base of the 
mass mobilization was not wide or strong enough to 
sustain the opposition movement — though the role of 
political repression has been much more decisive in 
this regard.
Finally, the widening divisions within the ruling elites 
and popular awareness thereof were highly  effective in 
generating the public outburst. Internal disunity took 
place on a number of levels: first, despite sharp 
differences between the ruling Fundamentalists and the 
contending Reformists, the Reformist candidates had 
been approved by  the Council of Guardians; and the 
Reformists obviously confirmed their allegiance to the 
Constitution and the theocratic system; all this 
(apparently) provided a margin of safety for the public 
to come out on the streets and demonstrate in large 
numbers; in this way they were supporting some of the 
candidates and political figures who had, presumably, 
been endorsed by the core clerical elite.
At a second level, emerging signs of division between 
the Fundamentalist faction in power and the 
Traditionalist-Conservative parties within the power 
bloc (especially between Rafsanjani and the 
Fundamentalists) generated the expectation (or perhaps 
the illusion) that  the Traditionalist-Conservative clerics 
would actively support the Green movement; so the 
perception was that the movement enjoyed the tacit 
support of some Conservative parties who had become 
disenchanted with the economic and foreign policies of 
the ruling Fundamentalist faction. And finally, on a 
third level, signs of some emerging divisions within the 
ruling Fundamentalist faction, in parliament and 
outside, and reluctance on the part of many 
Fundamentalist MPs to support the current president’s 
candidacy, might have been further encouraging for the 
supporters of the opposition movement. Of course, 
following the announcement of the election results, and 
with increasing polarization of attitudes, some of those 
more secondary  rifts would disappear as the 
Conservative and Traditionalist parties would rush to 
the support of the government and the position of the 
Supreme Leader at a time of deep crisis threatening the 
very existence of the Islamic regime.
On the whole, although such an occasion for mass 
mobilization had been dreamt of by the external or 
even internal opposition groups for a long time, it had 
not been planned in any way; rather, it was the result of 
a rare political conjuncture — as is the case with 
almost all revolutionary situations.
DP: The other night at a panel discussion on the 
situation in Iran held in Chicago, the sociologist 
Ahmad Sadri argued that we are witnessing the 
“beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic.”(9) Do 
you agree?
HB: In order to begin to think about any breakdown, 
we need to know the consequences of the recent crisis 
and confrontation for the political system; that is, we 
need to ask what difference the recent developments 
have made to the regime in terms of the eight various 
analytical factors I laid out earlier. The consequences of 
the recent crisis and confrontation are manifold; and we 
need to assess the durability  of the government in terms 
of these consequences.
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My general argument has been that if the political 
system had previously experienced any sort of crisis, it 
is now intensified and has gone through a qualitative 
change. In terms of ideological legitimacy, the 
preexisting deficit has now become a first-degree crisis 
of legitimacy. The Islamic Republic claimed, from its 
inception, to be at least partly based on popular support 
and consent; one could argue that in the conception of 
the Islamic Republic, “Republic” as the noun is more 
essential than “Islamic” as the adjective of that noun 
(at least in the Persian language this is the type of 
perception we have about nouns and adjectives). 
Elections have been held regularly  and even the 
Supreme Leaders have considered elections and 
popular participation as a major basis of the political 
system. Of course, as we know, elections in the Islamic 
Republic are restricted in the sense that all candidates 
in all elections have to be declared as qualified by the 
Council of Guardians, which is the legislative arm of 
the Supreme Leader. In any  case, according to the 
opposition, which enjoys a mass following, even the 
institutionally restricted elections have not been 
respected by the regime itself.
During the June election, all four candidates had been 
endorsed by the Council of Guardians and indirectly 
by the Supreme Leader; yet popular support for the 
two Reformist candidates has increasingly  been 
regarded by the regime as counter-revolutionary, and 
as we have seen, peaceful protesters have been beaten 
and crushed for legally  protesting against the official 
election results. In the eyes of supporters of the mass 
Green Movement, they had done nothing except 
legally  protest against the election results, but they 
were treated ruthlessly  and violently (even the Council 
of Guardians itself admitted that on the basis of a 
partial recount some three million votes had been 
manipulated; and if a full recount had been allowed, 
perhaps the allegations of the Reformist  candidates 
would have been corroborated). The Supreme Leader’s 
endorsement of the official election results — even 
before the partial recount, which he had himself 
allowed — caused the sense of illegitimacy to spread, 
in the eyes of the protestors and opposition, from the 
government to the entire political system.
Furthermore, the Supreme Leader’s rather explicit 
permission for the ruthless suppression of any 
demonstrations, and their actual violent suppression, 
further intensified the crisis and deficit of legitimacy. 
If previously there was a second or even third degree 
crisis of legitimacy, in the sense that the policies of the 
government had faced popular objection, now with the 
recent turn of events a first-degree crisis of legitimacy 
has come about, throwing into question the legitimacy 
of the entire system.
In terms of legitimacy, therefore, the recent 
confrontation has had several consequences. Firstly: it 
has somewhat exposed or uncovered the nature of the 
power structure; previously  the Supreme Leader had 
been regarded (at least by the politically  uninformed or 
misinformed) as being neutral in factional rivalries and 
as standing above the various factions like an impartial 
judge; but this illusion was shattered by  the Leader 
himself when he announced that he had personal 
political preferences and actually supported the current 
government and policies and would endorse them at 
any  price. Previously  there was a disagreement 
concerning the role and position of the Supreme 
Leader; some political activists and commentators 
regarded him as politically  weak or impartial; 
accordingly, he did not have a base of social support 
for himself, despite his great institutional powers, and 
so he had to adjust to the policies of whatever 
government was in power (Rafsanjani’s from 1989 to 
1997 and Khatami’s from 1997 to 2005). 
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But in fact, he had been trying to uphold his own power 
and position; this had not been possible during 
Rafsanjani’s presidency or during Khatami’s; but 
Khamenei eventually emerged as the architect of a 
f u n d a m e n t a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e t o r e f o r m a n d 
democratization after 2004 by encouraging the 
formation of the fundamentalist bloc which won the 
various elections in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008 and now 
2009.
So the Leader’s own pronouncements and actions 
demonstrated that he was the core figure and the real 
coordinator. In terms of legitimacy, however, this was 
not in his self-interest, as he removed all the mists of 
illusion and put himself in direct confrontation with the 
popular opposition. In a superficial sense, which is very 
meaningful in the history  of modern Iran, he was 
moving from a constitutional to an absolutist sort of 
velayat (rule). So, on the whole the recent confrontation 
has made the power structure of the regime more 
transparent for the general public.
A second consequence of the recent crisis and 
confrontation is going to be a growing belief among the 
ruling cliques about the disruptive nature of elections 
and high popular participation; elections will be 
considered disruptive; mass participation of the people 
in elections will not be seen as an advantage for the 
regime; if this is going to be the case, then the 
legitimacy  of the regime will be further undermined. 
Thirdly, and in a parallel way, the people can be 
expected to lose their belief in the value of voting and 
political participation, which is yet another factor in the 
erosion of political legitimacy. So in this way the 
electoral aspect of the theocracy is going to be 
discredited from both directions, and apparently the 
regime will have to rely more heavily on the 
undemocratic or clerical-aristocratic aspect of the 
system.
A fourth outcome of the recent confrontation, which 
should be taken into account in any assessment of the 
future course of events, is the expansion of the circle of 
“counter-revolution”; some hardliners are already 
talking about the “new hypocrites” (referring to the 
Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK, which was ousted from 
the political arena in the early years of the revolution 
and which was labeled as the party of hypocrites).(10) I 
think the most important impact of the current upheaval 
and confrontation (which again has to be reckoned with 
in any projection of the future) is the increasing 
disappearance of the feeling of fear, which has been the 
main basis of the political order; a feeling of courage to 
express long pent-up grievances is the hallmark of the 
current developments. As a rule, both on an individual 
as well as a social level, anger kills fear; the 
government did everything it could, in the span of a 
few weeks, to make the general public angry, frustrated 
and desperate. The “counting” of the votes, the 
humiliating arrogance, the intimidation, the brutality, 
the detentions, the violent repression, and so on, caused 
widespread anger and indignation. If all the pent-up 
grievances had been tolerated for years because of fear, 
now anger caused by imprudent government action is 
paving the way for a catharsis.
Photojournalist: SASAN AFSOOSI - 
safsoosi@gmail.com
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Authoritarian regimes usually  attempt to compensate 
for the loss of ideological legitimacy either by 
resorting to more coercive and repressive measures or 
by turning to more public welfare services. In the case 
of Iran after June 2009, what has happened is the 
expansion of the coercive dimension or base of the 
regime as a compensation for the legitimacy deficit. 
This in itself means a transformation in the character 
or type of the regime, which is becoming more 
militaristic; a militaristic language is now utilized by 
the armed forces in reference to the opposition 
movement. This tendency is of vital significance for 
the future course of developments, if the political 
system is to remain in place. Given the prevailing 
economic situation mentioned above, as well as the 
limited managerial capability of the government, there 
is little chance of success for any attempt at 
compensation for the loss of legitimacy  through the 
expansion of the public sector and provision of 
welfare; indeed, the system had already been suffering 
from a crisis of efficient management.
Out of the four main bases of regime stability  — 
legitimacy, efficiency, elite unity, and coercive 
capacity — it seems that  only the latter has remained 
functioning, at least for the time being. The unity of 
the ruling elites of the Islamic Republic has also been 
somewhat damaged. To be sure, factionalism, as 
discussed above, had always existed among the ruling 
elites. Interventionism vs. non-interventionism, socio-
economic modernization vs. adherence to tradition, 
and Islamization vs. democratization have been some 
of the major points of contention in the life of the 
Islamic Republic over the last 30 years. But in a sense, 
all these cleavages and rifts had been non-
antagonistic; the significance of the recent 
confrontation is that it  has turned non-antagonistic 
divisions and rifts into antagonistic ones. Several 
moderate and reformist  parties which had been 
regarded as members of the family  of the Revolution 
are now being castigated as counter-revolutionary. The 
unity  of the ruling elites is being damaged as 
antagonistic rifts are emerging, firstly between 
Reformist and Fundamentalist parties, secondly within 
the clerical institutions, and thirdly within the military 
elite. More indications of increasingly antagonistic 
rifts are emerging every day.
It seems that the Reformist parties are not to be 
tolerated any more, as hundreds of party  leaders and 
members are being detained and imprisoned.(11) They 
are already disqualified as illegitimate and counter-
revolutionary  parties; in fact it seems that political 
party  activity  will become meaningless in the 
emerging power structure; so the reformist  parties will 
definitely find themselves in an entirely different 
situation and consequently will have to adopt new 
positions, if they can continue to exist at all. The 
Participation Front has been hit the hardest. There are 
also some indications of growing division within the 
clergy associated with the Supreme Leader and the 
more independent-minded clerics in Qom, who have 
tacitly or explicitly opposed the crackdown.(12) There 
are even some signs of division within the 
Revolutionary  Guards; in the early years there were 
some differences of opinion between the commanders 
of the Western and Southern war fronts; following the 
crackdown an open letter has been written by a 
number of older commanders to the Supreme Leader, 
questioning his endorsement of the election results 
before full investigation and the violent repression of 
the protest demonstrations. Still it seems that the 
regime’s point of strength lies in its coercive capacity 
and the unity of its coercive forces, at a time when the 
legitimacy  of the political system is coming under 
question. So in responding to your question, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the regime should be 
taken into account.
Likewise, we need to take into account the state of the 
opposition movement, its strengths and weaknesses. 
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We need to consider the four factors in relation to the 
opposition movement that has erupted. In analyzing 
socio-political opposition movements, as already 
mentioned, we need to examine the state of mass 
discontent, the organizational network, the ideology 
and the leadership  of the movement. Concerning 
popular discontent, historical experience shows that 
potential mass dissatisfaction and discontent in 
authoritarian regimes becomes effective when made 
actual through a specific catalyst. Socio-economic and 
cultural discontent must become politicized to have 
political effects. What politicized all the pre-exiting 
potential discontents was the issue of fraud in the 
election as alleged by the opposition candidates 
supported by a large popular movement. We have 
already explained why and how public anger and 
indignation was produced as a result  of government 
actions. Now all the grievances were finding a political 
focus or epicenter; the annulment of the election was 
the first  public request, but as intimidation and 
suppression followed mass demonstrations, a new 
cause for anger and frustration was added to the initial 
one, now targeting the leadership of the Islamic 
Republic. The steam of general public discontent, as it 
were, was now finding a political engine. Thus public 
discontent was being organized into a specific public 
demand. As we have seen, public discontent without 
organization and mobilization leads to nothing. In 
terms of organization, a quite adequate organizational 
network (including the electoral headquarters, student 
organizations, electronic means of communication, the 
Internet and so on) has emerged and has proved 
capable of providing the necessary rudimentary 
functions. Of course the organizational capability  of 
oppositions has a converse relation to the coercive 
capacity of regimes. In our case so far, government 
coercion has almost demolished the organizational 
capability of the opposition, but things are not going to 
remain as they are now. For one thing, the 
organizational capacity of the opposition is a function 
of its leadership. A number of people have emerged as 
leaders, but as usually happens in such situations, 
moderate leaders will be gradually replaced with more 
radical ones. So far Mossavi, Karroubi and Khatami 
have led the movement very cautiously and moderately; 
on the other hand Ayatollah Montazeri has issued a very 
significant statement justifying public rebellion against 
the theocratic system and considering the regime as 
already deposed because of its unjust and cruel 
treatment of the protestors.(13) The gradual replacement 
of more moderate by more radical leadership would also 
mean an escalation in the ideology of the movement, 
from questioning the election results to questioning the 
very legitimacy of the whole power structure.
So two factors stand out as decisive in the outcome of 
the turmoil: the coercive capacity of the government and 
its ability and readiness to use it; and the leadership  of 
the movement and its ability  and readiness to redefine 
its ideological objectives and enhance its organizational 
capability.
DP: Speaking of the leadership of the movement, some 
have questioned whether it  has any. What do you make 
of this? Is Moussavi the movement’s leader, or is he 
being led by the movement? To the extent  that the 
movement has a horizontal or decentralized structure, do 
you view this as a weakness or a strength — or neither? 
And what does this all portend for the movement’s 
prospects?
HB: Usually, leaders of revolutionary or oppositional 
movements can be classified into three main types: 
ideologues; mobilizers/orators; and managers. 
Sometimes all the three types may  merge into a single 
leader, but  most  of the time different leaders represent 
the various types. Ayatollah Khomeini was both an 
ideologue and a mobilizer/orator; but  the management 
of the movement was left to local leaders, as he was in 
exile at the time. Lenin turned out to be a combination 
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of the three types, as was Mao. In the case of today’s 
Green opposition movement in Iran, the role of 
leadership is not concentrated in one person, so the 
three leadership  functions are not performed. There is 
no ideological leader, in the sense of grand 
ideological schemes; it is more of a democratic than 
an “ideological” movement; the aspirations of the 
movement are clear enough and some of them can 
even be traced back to the current  Islamic 
Constitution. Statements and pronouncements issued 
by Moussavi and Karroubi as well as some high-
ranking clerics such as Montazeri, Saanei and 
Kadivar clearly indicate the movement’s ideological 
aims.
Oppositional ideologies can be offensive or defensive 
in posture. Revolutionary movements usually require 
an offensive ideology, projecting a completely 
different or novel socio-political order and structure, 
whereas defensive ideologies usually present public 
grievances or complain about the encroachment of 
the regime upon the rights of the subject population; 
defensive ideologies and ideological leaderships are 
usually characteristics of “revolts” rather than 
revolutions; peasant revolts, tax revolts, bread riots 
and aristocratic rebellions are usually  based on a 
defensive ideology. We could call Iran’s Green 
movement an “electoral fraud revolt.” The religious 
revolt or rebellion of 1963 against  the Shah’s policies, 
led by Ayatollah Khomeini, was a defensive revolt; it 
attempted to safeguard the Constitution against the 
modernizing autocratic tendencies of the Shah. In a 
sense, the current Green movement is rather similar 
to the 1963 revolt, in that it  is similarly a protest 
against autocratic and militaristic tendencies and 
repressive policies in the name of the existing 
Constitution (although the repression now has been 
much more brutal than it was then). Ayatollah 
Khomeini had similarly asked for the proper 
implementation of the Constitution. But a defensive 
movement or revolt can turn into a revolutionary 
movement, as was the case with the Puritan 
Revolution in England and the American Revolution. 
I think that the Green movement can resurrect the 
ideals of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, as 
well as the aspirations of the early phase of the 
revolution of 1979. And this would be good enough, 
as the most fundamental political conflict and 
cleavage in Iran since the end of the 19th century  has 
been that between autocracy (whether royal or 
clerical) and democracy/popular sovereignty. To 
become more offensive, however, the ideology needs 
to be differentiated from the dominant theocratic 
tendency in the constitution; and this is what  the 
current oppositional leadership  seems to be rather 
reluctant to propose.
More recently, however, the office of the Supreme 
Leader has come under attack for carrying out 
repression and engaging in illegal acts; two open 
letters reportedly  issued by the Association of 
Previous Majles (Parliament) Deputies and the 
Association of Qom Religious Teachers and Clerics 
have blamed the Supreme Leader for what has 
transpired since June 12 and have declared him 
incompetent to continue as the Supreme Leader 
according to the constitution. They have called on the 
clerical Assembly of Experts to reconsider the 
leader’s competence for leadership. If the Assembly 
of Experts could gain some independence from the 
office of the Supreme Leader and could represent the 
clergy at large and exert control over that office, the 
democratic aspect of the theocracy  would be highly 
enhanced; in that case, the independent members of 
the clergy could emerge as the main leadership  group 
in a would-be transition from absolutist theocracy to 
constitutional theocracy, or even to a pure and simple 
democracy.
With regard to the second function — mobilization 
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— given the state of repression, the current 
opposition leadership  is severely restricted; the 
existing, rather weak civil society  associations have 
been further repressed and restricted. There is an 
obvious connection between repression and 
mobilization: with increasing repression, the chances 
for mass mobilization decrease, as the cost of 
political activity  rises, while less repression on the 
part of the regime, or more toleration — or at least 
vacillation —encourages mass action. In the case of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his close associates in the 
1978-79 revolution, political mobilization was 
facilitated by the fact that they  were in exile and 
could easily  call on the people to rise against the 
regime and risk their lives in the face of repression. 
But the current oppositional leadership does not 
enjoy  the same immunity. They are not ready  to go to 
the extreme in the face of severe repression. Finally, 
the managerial structure of the leadership is not well 
knit together, again because of repression. As a rule, 
opposition leaderships in revolutionary movements 
gain decisive importance and roles under two types 
of conditions: first, when the state has more or less 
lost its monopoly on the use of the means of violence 
(as in the case of the English, Chinese, Cuban and 
Nicaraguan Revolutions), and second, when the 
regime is in a state of vacillation and hesitation vis-à-
vis the use of violence, and as a result the opposition 
gets the opportunity to mobilize (as in the case of the 
1979 Iranian Revolution). As we have already seen, 
revolutions do not take place merely because there is 
mass discontent and a large opposition movement 
and a revolutionary ideology and leadership; they still 
do not take place even if, in addition to all that, the 
regime suffers from severe crises of legitimacy and 
efficiency and unity. What usually sounds the death 
knell for authoritarian regimes is a crisis of coercion 
and dominat ion. Obviously a s t rong and 
ideologically-dedicated leadership  can contribute to 
such a crisis of domination and coercion, by 
constantly enticing the public in the face of severe 
repression and by resorting to all forms of political 
campaign.
Finally, under the current circumstances I think that 
the rise of a dissident cleric, such as Montazeri, at the 
head of the movement, could make a great deal of 
difference in terms of political mobilization and the 
realignment of political forces and actors.
DP: Several parallels have been drawn between the 
present events and those of 1978-79, the most 
obvious being the mass street demonstrations and the 
echoes of Allahu Akbar. In fact during the revolution 
of three decades ago it took much longer — many 
months — for the crowds to grow to the size we saw 
within a matter of days in June 2009. On the other 
hand, some argue emphatically  that this is not a 
revolutionary  movement or situation, pointing to the 
fact that the “Green Wave” phenomenon is bound up 
with the presidential candidacy of a figure 
(Moussavi) who was operating within the framework 
of the Islamic Republic.(14) How do you view this? 
As a scholar of the 1979 revolution, do you see 
parallels between the two moments?
HB: To me it seems that the current confrontation 
may well turn into a thoroughly revolutionary 
situation, given the intensity  of popular anger and 
frustration and the humiliating way the government 
has responded to it. But there are, as always, both 
similarities and differences between the two 
historical situations; and in any case there is no need 
for the current confrontation to be an exact replica of 
1979 in order to turn into a revolutionary  situation; it 
may do so on its own merits.
Now we can elaborate on the similarities and 
differences in terms of the several theoretical criteria 
we have already used to explain the nature of the  
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situation. So first, in terms of a crisis of legitimacy, it 
seems that the Islamic regime has been depleting its 
own legitimacy from within, by violating its own 
rules: the reformist candidates had been allowed to 
stand for election but then peaceful protests on the 
part of their supporters regarding the disputed results 
are violently and brutally suppressed. The Shah’s 
regime at the time was facing the opposition of an 
outside contender in Khomeini, one who would 
normally be repressed by an authoritarian regime. So 
for such a regime, the Shah’s repression could seem 
more “normal” (norms of repression) than the Islamic 
regime’s repression, as it is repressing an opposition 
which is an insider, or part of the family, as some say. 
From another perspective, legitimacy has also 
something to do with longevity and durability; the 
imperial monarchy had been in place for 2,500 years, 
whereas Islamic theocracy has been around only  for 
30 years. Obviously the institution of Persian 
monarchy had been in a state of crisis since the late 
19th century, leading to the Constitutional Revolution 
(1906-1911), which provided a criterion for gauging 
the legitimacy of the system, i.e. the Shah was to 
reign and not rule, and the breach of the constitution 
in this regard was a sure sign of the royal 
government’s crisis of legitimacy.
A similar argument could be and has been developed 
in the case of the Islamic Republic, in the sense that 
the Sovereign Theologian (or Supreme Leader) 
should stand above factional conflicts. However, 
there is a great deal of difference between the 
constitutions of 1906 and of 1979 in that the latter is 
evidently  not constitutionalist but absolutist: there is 
no real separation of powers and the Ruling Jurist (or 
Supreme Leader) has supremacy over the three 
branches of government. So we cannot speak of a 
deficit of legitimacy only in this very  technical and 
restricted sense, since the Ruling Theologian both 
reigns and rules. This in itself, on the other hand, is 
obviously in contradiction to the ideals of a popular 
revolution which was supposed to restrict the power 
of the ruler; and it points to the more general and 
historical problem of legitimacy as far as the 
theocracy  is concerned. But there is a more mundane 
sense of a legitimation crisis usually  felt by the 
general run of the people, and that is when instead of 
persuasion, force is used to keep a people in its place; 
and this is exactly  the meaning of the crisis of 
legitimacy  as it  is unfolding. The crisis of legitimacy 
as a major ingredient of a revolutionary situation has 
become grave.
A clear difference between the two historical 
situations is to be found in the rulers’ will to 
repression. The shah’s regime, after an initial period 
of suppression, lost its will to power and gradually 
shifted to a policy of moderation, toleration and 
compromise: the Shah’s hearing of the message of the 
revolution, the negotiations with the National Front, 
the Bakhtiar regime, the Paris negotiations, the 
Shah’s flight  and so on; apparently the Carter human 
rights policy  and U.S. pressure (in the context of 
differences of interest  and opinion between 
Washington and Tehran following the oil embargo of 
1973) had something to do with the loss of the will to 
repression. But so far the Islamic regime’s will to 
repression has remained firm; maybe it is still too 
early to judge, given the circular nature of 
demonstrations and protests taking place every now 
and then, in a fashion reminiscent of the events of 
1978. In terms of U.S. –Iran relations, it seems that 
the current administration’s approach may have 
contributed to the will to suppression.
The decline or continuation of the will to suppression 
is partly a result of the state of unity within the ruling 
group; in the case of the Shah’s regime, elite unity 
was in a sense damaged by the Carter human rights 
policy, and the Shah vacillated between repression 
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and relative toleration. As we have already seen, some 
major signs of division within the ruling elite of the 
Islamic Republic are also emerging. Once begun, such 
divisions and rifts are hard to contain; they  tend to 
escalate and drag all political actors into the abyss. 
Hence the current confrontation seems increasingly  to 
be creating a revolutionary situation.
Differences also exist in terms of the nature of the 
opposition. In terms of popular discontent, a similar 
pattern has occurred, a pattern I have already explained 
in terms of the J-Cure theory. In the case of the Shah’s 
regime, a long period of economic stability and growth 
from 1962 to 1976 was followed by a sharp reversal 
and downturn, creating an intolerable gap between 
popular expectations and government capabilities. In 
the case of the Islamic Republic, the same pattern has 
come about albeit with a different content, which is not 
economic but political: a long period of moderation 
and relative toleration under Rafsanjani and Khatami 
from 1989 to 2005 (the post-Khomeini period) was 
followed by a sharp reversal and downturn under the 
militaristic-fundamentalist regime of Ahmadinejad. 
The specter of its repetition in June 2009 caused 
widespread fear, anger and dread and led to the 
confrontation.
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In terms of ideology, it seems that the current 
confrontation is more specific in nature than was the 
case with the slogan of “Islamic Republic” in 1978-9. 
Indeed its specificity makes it non-revolutionary, since 
(at least as far as the top leaders are concerned) its aim 
is to annul the disputed election; however, as with the 
early phase of the 1978-9 revolution, the moderate 
opposition was calling for the implementation of the 
constitution and a constitutional monarchy; obviously 
it was the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini which 
made the difference, calling for a complete revolution 
— something the reformist leaders have not been 
willing to take up; the most they have called for so far 
is the holding of a referendum for endorsing or 
annulling the election results (which has to be allowed 
by the leaders of the Islamic Republic).
So, on the whole it seems that  some of the ingredients 
of a revolutionary  situation have already  come about 
but some others have not (yet) materialized.
DP: What do you make of the responses of certain 
leftists in the Western Hemisphere to the events 
unfolding in Iran — from the likes of James Petras 
defending the official election results and dismissing 
any doubts about their authenticity  as an imperialist 
“hoax” to MRZine (the online organ of the venerable 
socialist magazine Monthly Review) openly  defending 
Ahmadinejad as an anti-imperialist to Hugo Chávez 
embracing Ahmadinejad as a “revolutionary” ally and 
the Foreign Ministry  of Venezuela denouncing the 
Iranian street demonstrations:
The Bolivarian Government of Venezuela expresses its 
firm opposition to the vicious and unfounded 
campaign to discredit  the institutions of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, unleashed from outside, designed to 
roil the political climate of our brother country. From 
Venezuela, we denounce these acts of interference in 
the internal affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
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while demanding an immediate halt to the maneuvers 
to threaten and destabilize the Islamic Revolution.(15)
It’s important to note that there have been strong 
critical responses from others on the Left to such 
statements — those of Reese Erlich, Hamid Dabashi, 
Saeed Rahnema, the Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy, and others.(16) What is your impression 
of these contending positions?
HB: To me it  seems that such unfavorable reactions to 
the popular movement in Iran are not  hard to explain. I 
think they result from three factors: first, ignorance of 
and misinformation about the nature of the political 
system in Iran since the Revolution, the various 
historical phases it has gone through and the widening 
gap between official ideology and public opinion, 
particularly the rapid secularization of society under 
the theocracy; consequently  such regimes end up 
being more popular among some foreigners than 
among their own people. Secondly they result from 
financial and commercial self-interest and the special 
favorable commercial relations Iran has with some of 
the countries mentioned; obviously they think more of 
their own national interests than the interests of the 
Iranian people. In my opinion, analyses resulting from 
such positions and interests are not much worth 
discussing from an academic point of view. 
Ideological regimes tend to create their own satellites 
or close friends, who obviously endorse their policies 
and actions. Here we can add Islamist  parties and 
organizations in the Arab world and their ideological/
commercial ties with the Islamic Republic. Thirdly, 
such analyses result from the analysts’ attachment to 
and use of obsolete theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks, divorced from current developments 
(what Ulrich Beck calls “zombie categories”); as a 
result, they  accept demagogical positions at face value 
and confuse Fascism with Socialism.
I think that the leftist responses you have mentioned 
have forgotten all about the democratic dimensions of 
Marxism and have fallen prey to demagogy in this 
case. They  sometimes forget that the extreme Right 
and the extreme Left deceptively look alike. In the 
case of Venezuela, a combination of pseudo-leftist 
appraisals and commercial interests have been at 
work. The Venezuelan government knows nothing 
about the political situation and public opinion in Iran, 
which is increasingly turning against the foreign allies 
of the Islamic Republic. Russia’s support has already 
brought about chants of “Death to Russia” from 
protestors on the streets of Tehran.
Regarding more theoretical responses, I would say that 
the type of class analysis applicable to the case of Iran 
in a long-term sense is very different from the type of 
class analysis usually  applied in a short-term sense. 
From a long-term historical perspective, the main 
social conflict has been taking place not among the 
social classes belonging to one social formation, but 
between those belonging to two social formations: 
pre-modern and modern. The historical meaning of 
various political developments in Iran should be 
understood in terms of this underlying conflict: the 
Constitutional Revolution signified the victory of the 
social classes of the modern formation over the social 
forces of the traditional/pre-modern formation. In its 
own peculiar way, the absolutist state structure of the 
Pahlavi regime further strengthened the modern social 
formation (albeit in the framework of modernization 
from above under a dictatorship). The traditional 
social forces made a comeback after the revolution of 
1979 and imposed the traditional political-cultural 
pattern of elitism, authoritarianism, patrimonialism 
and cultural order, discipline and obedience under the 
rule of a theocracy. With the subsequent development 
of the modern formation and its social forces, 
advocating the ideas of citizenship, political equality, 
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[21]
democracy, popular sovereignty and socio-cultural 
freedom (as partly seen in the Green Movement), the 
underlying contradiction between the world of 
coercively-reconstructed tradition and the democratic 
path is bound to come to a head, as we are witnessing 
now.
DP: There are discordant views among progressives on 
whether the Obama administration should move 
forward in engaging Iran at present, given the 
circumstances. Some progressives — particularly 
Iranians — argue that the U.S. should hold off for the 
moment on engaging Iran; Karim Sadjadpour of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently 
gave expression to this view:
For the first  time ever, I think we shouldn’t even 
be talking about engaging Iran, we should take a 
wait and see approach. The strategic imperative 
to have relations with Iran will always remain, 
but let’s wait until the dust settles in Tehran. ... 
By prematurely  calling for engagement I think 
we run the risk of demoralizing the opposition 
and the millions of people who took to the 
streets and who continue to reject the legitimacy 
of the Ahmadinejad government; we implicitly 
endorse an election that is still being hotly 
contested in Tehran and tip  the balance in favor 
of the hardliners.(17)
Others — particularly  in the American peace movement 
— call for engagement and diplomacy regardless of the 
post-election aftermath. Thus Reza Aslan, author of 
How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the 
End of the War on Terror, recently argued that one
must not ignore the dramatic opportunities for 
long-term change in Iran that have emerged as a 
result of this crisis, opportunities to which the 
international community must respond through 
a confident and coherent policy of 
engagement. ... [A] concerted dialogue with 
Iran ... will offer moral and political support 
for the genuine expression of the will of the 
Iranian people at a time when the regime’s 
authority is at  an ebb. Most important, it will 
offer Iranians hope. ... if the West keeps 
talking to Iran, it  can empower its citizens to 
change their society from the ground up, and 
to influence those who have the capacity to 
act from the top down.(18)
What is your view on this question?
HB: I am definitely in agreement with those arguing 
against engagement. I too think that engagement 
would in a sense grant  legitimacy  to a regime 
confronting a very deep crisis of legitimacy, on the 
one hand, and would alienate a democratically-
inclined and growing opposition movement, which 
expects moral support  from all democratic nations, 
on the other.
I think that  now is the worst time for the U.S. 
government to pursue a policy  of engagement, as the 
regime in Iran is at  its worst; it should have tried 
when the Iranian regime was at its best, that is during 
the Khatami presidency  (of course the Iranian 
fundamentalist groups were opposed to it at the time). 
As we all know, rational decision-making in general 
and in the field of foreign policy in particular should 
take many factors into account — the current 
political environment, reactions of other decision-
makers, intended and unintended consequences, 
among others — and not just  react to the policies of a 
previous rival administration. One specific factor 
which needs to be taken into account in this case 
(regardless of the issues relating to regional and 
international security) is the impact on the Iranian 
democratic opposition in the shorter as well as the 




Although the Iranian government’s perception that no 
threat now comes from the U.S. under the new 
administration (unlike its perceptions following the 
invasion of Iraq) may have made it feel more 
comfortable dealing with and suppressing the 
opposition movement recently, and the government 
may have thus indirectly benefited from the new 
foreign policy orientation in the U.S., any 
engagement policy would definitely (and this time 
directly) embolden the government vis-à-vis the 
democratic opposition, which would be another 
instance of a familiar foreign policy pattern 
particularly common during the Cold War era. We all 
remember the case of British and American support 
of the regime of South Africa and its Apartheid 
system during the Cold War, which played a part in 
stifling the anti-Apartheid movement and which 
endorsed the apartheid regime. On the other hand, the 
new western foreign policy towards South Africa that 
was gradually adopted towards the end of the 1980s, 
with the end of the Cold War situation, contributed to 
the weakening of the Apartheid regime and 
encouraged the anti-Apartheid movement. More 
generally  as a rule, if democratization gained pace in 
many parts of the world in the 1990s, it was partly 
due to the abandonment of the security-based western 
foreign policy  supporting all sorts of regimes opposed 
to the Eastern bloc. More precisely, it was not active 
support for the democratic oppositions, but rather 
disowning the non-democratic regimes, that 
contributed to the transitions. In the case of Iran-U.S. 
relations, the U.S. government has already 
experienced a similar episode, when it gradually 
withdrew its support from the Shah’s regime and thus 
encouraged the anti-Shah opposition.
DP: I’d like to close by discussing your intellectual 
biography. How would you locate yourself on the 
intellectual-political map? What are, and have been, 
your main theoretical reference points and 
influences? There are strong Gramscian flavors in 
your book State and Revolution in Iran, which you 
wrote as a doctoral dissertation under the supervision 
of Ernesto Laclau. Has Gramsci continued to 
influence your thinking? Has Laclau? How would 
you characterize the arc of your outlook over the last 
three decades? How have your views changed over 
the course of time?
HB: I studied the Marxist  literature on political 
sociology  at the University  of Essex where Ernesto 
Laclau and Bob Jessop taught me. I was and have 
remained interested in many aspects of the political-
sociological ideas of Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas, 
Laclau and Barrington Moore, and I have used them 
in my works. Later on I developed an interest in the 
work of Michel Foucault and his analysis of power, 
and I have used some aspects of his ideas in my more 
recent works. I have always considered these thinkers 
as building blocks for political sociology, an area still 
under construction. More recently I have focused on 
the political sociology of democratization, especially 
with reference to the Middle East.
DP: What occasioned this shift  in your thinking from 
a largely  Marxist frame of reference to a more post-
Marxist/Foucauldian one?
HB: I considered Foucault’s work on discourse and 
power as a culmination of Marx’s understanding of 
ideology and power; somehow they seemed akin, but 
Foucault’s provided a wider scope for application.
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The secularization thesis has dominated in social 
science for more then a century (Klein Goldewijk 
2007: 30). The idea was that the role of religion 
would decrease due to modernisation (Philpott 2002: 
81). This thesis disregarded the cultural and historical 
foundations of religion in many societies, but time 
showed that people didn’t  stop  believing nor that 
religious organizations would cease to exist. But Iran 
shows that religious actors are as vibrant as ever. 
Although now scholars say  the number of political 
religious actors increased after 9/11, in Iran religion 
has played a political and social role since the 15th 
century.
Background of the Shi’ism
Shi’ism is rooted in a political movement in the 7th 
century Arabia (Eickelman 2002: 256). The principle 
Shi’i belief is that succession must be granted to the 
son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, Ali or his 
descendents. The Safavid empire (1501-1722) made 
Shi’ism the state religion in Iran and eliminated other 
forms of Islam (Lapidus 2002: 242). The Safavids 
also created a state-controlled Islamic bureaucracy. 
As a result the Ulama became a strong social 
network.
After the fall of the Safavids in the 17th century, the 
Ulama was liberated from state control (Lapidus 
2002: 244). The Shi’i scholars challenged the 
legitimacy  of the Shah as the primary  bearer of 
Shi’ism, just like Khomeini questioned the Shah’s 
legitimacy.  The Ulama asserted that religious 
scholars bore the highest religious authority. During 
the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925) the Ulama 
increasingly grew stronger (Lapidus 2002: 469). 
Religious actors kept playing a role to defend their 
own interests in the Constitutional Revolution 
(1906-1911), the oil nationalization movement of 
Mossadeqh (1950s), and the Islamic revolution 
(1977-1979) (Mansourian 2007: 219). According to 
Lapidus ‘the struggle between the Ulama and the 
state, was a principle feature of Iranian history [for 
200 years]”(Lapidus 2002: 469). But the religious 
establishment didn’t only  oppose the shah, they also 
played a vital role in the countermovement that lead 
to the failure of the opposition (Mansourian 2007: 
221). The Ulama were primarily concerned with 
limiting the power of the Shah and the secular 
opposition and followed their own class interests 
(Mansourian 2007: 219).
Religious agents in the revolution
Before the Islamic revolution there was a strong link 
between the bazaar in Teheran (merchants) and the 
Ulama.  The Ulama depended on contributions of 
bazaar merchants, and the Ulama gave the merchants 
legitimacy  in the business world (Mansourian 2007: 
220). As a result the Ulama supported the bazaar 
merchants, when the central authorities tried to limit 
their power.
In 1953 Mossadeqh was overthrown (Lapidus 2002: 
480). The restored regime of Reza Shah ruled as a 
secular dictatorship and launched modernization 
programs to increase state power. This resulted in 
active hostilities of the Ulama, bazaar and 
intelligentsia who opposed the growing power of the 
shah, his dependence on foreign support and the 
created economic hardship  for the peasantry and 
lower middle classes (Lapidus 2002: 481). The 
ultraliberal market reforms marginalized both the 
Ulama, bazaar and secular civil groups. 
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The opposition was easily  crushed by the Iranian 
regime, but the Shah couldn’t beat the Ulama’s 
resistance to the state, which was provoked by  land 
reforms. In 1962 Mehdi Bazargan said that the 
collective struggle for a better society  was the role of 
the custodians of Islam (Lapidus 2002: 482). Dr. Ali 
Shari’ati created a new reform movement  which saw 
shi’ism as a form of religious protest, which also 
inspired the militant leftwing Islamic Mojahedin-i 
Khalq.
In 1971 Ayatollah Khomeini formed the concept 
velayat e-faqih, which meant the control of the state 
by the religious establishment (Lapidus 2002: 483). 
He became the symbol of protest against tyranny. In 
1978 the government newspaper criticized Khomeini, 
which resulted in the closure of the Bazaar and unrest 
(Mansourian: 226). In the 1970s the number of 
religious and non-religious protests were growing 
because of bad political and economic conditions. 
Eventually the Shah fled the country, while the army 
did nothing (Lapidus 2002: 484).
Masses of Iranians had been mobilized by  a coalition 
of religious and liberal leaders under the guidance of 
the highest Iranian religious authority, Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The revolution came in the name of Islam 
and not a secular ideology  as socialism. Victorious 
militant clergy transformed Islam as the idiom of the 
insurgency into Islam as object of the revolution. 
In the beginning the Ulama agreed to compromises 
with other social groups and democracy (Mansourian 
2007: 227). But later few religious figures who 
opposed Khomeini’s concept of velayat e-faqih on 
religious grounds couldn’t get  public support and 
were crushed. Ayatollahs Taleqani and Shariatmadari 
were marginalized. Former socialist, liberal and 
minority nationalist allies were mostly  executed or 
fled.
Religious opposition against the Islamic republic
Later the Islamic leftist group Mojahedin-I Khalq 
became one of the most important opposition groups 
against the republic and the religious Sunni leader of 
Iranian Kurds in that time, Ezzedin Husseini, stated 
that “many governments in the past have claimed to 
act in the name of Islam, but in reality they were not 
Islamic. The Safavid and Ottoman governments were 
cases in point; more recently we have the case of 
Khomeini in Iran. They  are queshri – backward and 
vulgar-and have ruined Islam and its spirit. What we 
have is not religious government, but a dictatorship 
under the name of Islam. In Sunni Islam there is no 
imam as political leader or na'ib (deputy) imam. The 
role of the clergy  is to be morshed, or guide, in 
knowing God. You will also find some Shi'i clergy 
who reject  Khomeini's concept of faqih. It is not an 
Islamic regime.” (Olson 1984: 924). 
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Mansourian (2007: 228) agrees that there is clerical 
resistance. He says the new dominance of the Ulama 
over the state destroyed the grassroots support of the 
bazaar and elites for the Ulama. As a result they 
became an apparatus of control and not an popular 
instrument of resistance. Mansourian says, that 
although it’s still a minority, a dissident religious 
class is rapidly growing in number and popularity 
among the elite, to resist the Velayat-e Faqih and to 
establish a democratic system of government. An 
example he says, is the liberal president Khatami who 
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lead the government for a short time, but was 
marginalized by more Islamic conservative forces. 
During Mohammed Khatami’s rule between 
1997-2005, there was a government based on more 
liberalism, openness and reforms.
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The rise of the Green movement 
In 2005 the hardliner Ahmadinejad came to power 
and the ‘reform era’ ended. During the recent 
presidential elections on June 12 2009 he was 
challenged by the reformist Mir Hussein Mousavi, but 
officially  he still won.  The opposition claimed the 
election was rigged, but the victorious candidate 
Ahmadinejad disputed this. The demonstrations 
against the election results in June, on Jerusalem day 
(last day of Ramadan) which is meant as a day to 
support Palestinians, the 30th anniversary  of the U.S. 
embassy on 4 November were all covered in the green 
colour of Islam. Green was the campaign colour of 
Mousavi. One of the popular methods of the pro-
Mousavi supporters was going on the top of their 
roofs to shout “Allahu Akbar” (God is greatest). This 
is one of the methods of protest  used by those who 
took part in the 1979 revolution.
According Mehdi Khalaji (2009), the opposition front 
runners, despite being lauded as modernizers, 
Mousavi, Khatami and Karroubi are deeply loyal to 
the ideals of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the 
founder of the Islamic Republic, and advocate a 
theocratic political system. This in contrast to the 
young men and women in the streets, who aim to 
bring down the very system of which their leaders are 
part. But even the young demonstrators use Islamic 
symbols.
It also lead to a ‘reformist’ tendency among some 
members of the Ulama. Ayatollah Motazari, who was 
the deputy of Ayatollah Khomeini, until a dispute 
between them led to Motazari being sidelined and 
eventually forced out of Iran’s power elite, have 
recently  resurfaced as a spiritual symbol of the 
reformist movement, says the Kurdish opposition 
politician Loghman H. Ahmedi (2009).
Concluding remarks
The ‘reformists’ as well as the hardliners legitimate 
their political claims with Islam. Both the green 
movement leaders and the hardliners are loyal to the 
Islamic revolutionary foundations of Iran. This 
loyalty to the Islamic state shows the vibrancy of 
Islamic actors in Iran and disapproves the 
secularization thesis. Although the secularization 
thesis predicts an end to religion, in Iran religion is 
alive as ever and will continue to play a role in the 
political system of Iran. Therefore an end to Islamic 
republic is unlikely. Even if the protests of the Green 
movement are not completely focused on Islam, 
Islamic actors will continue to play an important role 
in Iran.
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Identity Narratives among Second-






The elimination of national origin quotas in 
immigration policies increased the flow of 
immigrants to the United States from Asia, Latin 
America, and the African continent. As a result, new 
questions have been raised about how non-European 
immigrants are incorporated in the United States and 
how they come to understand and construct their 
identities in the United States.  In my research, I 
focused on the children of Iranian immigrants who 
migrated to the United States following the hostage 
crisis of 1979.  Iranian-Americans are uniquely 
situated immigrants within the larger population of 
immigrant groups given the context of global politics 
that surrounds their identity.  The context of 
incorporation and belonging for Iranians is embedded 
in the political tensions between the Iranian regime 
and the United States that has spanned over the last 
three decades, and the focus on global terrorism 
following the events of September 11th.   Through my 
in-depth interviews and the subsequent analysis I was 
able to illustrate that second generation Iranians 
utilized three particular narratives to understand their 
Iranian background and situate themselves as 
Americans.
Immigrant narrative: becoming American by 
losing “Iranian-ness”
The first narrative that emerged was grounded in the 
classic immigrant story.  The first  subtopic within this 
narrative encompassed the immigrant success story. 
Within this framework, American society  was 
perceived as the “land of opportunity” in which the 
“American dream” could be achieved.  With 
resilience, hard work and good work ethics 
immigrants can achieve upward mobility  and 
ultimately  become incorporated into U.S. society. 
Second-generation Iranians utilized the lived 
experiences of their parents and extended families in 
order to illustrate the possibility of achieving the 
American dream.  Thus for them, as long as they 
worked hard enough and “pulled themselves up  by 
their boot strings” then the “American dream” was 
widely  open to them.  This framework also allowed 
some of the participants to look down upon other 
immigrants and minority groups who had not 
achieved upward mobility.  Thus, some segments of 
the American population had either not wanted to 
succeed or had not worked hard enough.  Among my 
interviewees it was apparent that  they fully believed 
in the notions of individualism, equal opportunities, 
and eventual success in America.  For them, success 
was defined as monetary mobility and financial 
stability.  Second-generation Iranians in my sample 
were quite optimistic and fully invested in the 
“American dream,” which is indicative of their 
indoctrination into the American ethos. 
The second subtopic within this larger narrative was 
centered on certain Iranian societal/interactional 
styles such as “taroff,” which is most commonly  used 
when guests are visiting another’s home.  However, it 
is not exclusively limited to these social affairs; 
rather, it is also utilized during everyday interactions. 
This interactional style can take the shape of a back 
and forth offering between two or more people in 
which one person offers something and the other 
person is supposed to decline what is being offered. 
Ultimately, the recipient of the offer usually accepts 
what is being offered.   Among my respondents 
“taroffing” had to be modified in order for second-
generation Iranians to feel that they belonged to, 
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American society.  The interviewees were cognizant 
that “taroffing” created a certain degree of culture 
clash with their American friends and co-workers. 
However, at the same time, some of the respondents 
felt  that “taroffing” was an important aspect of their 
Iranian identities and that those Iranians who did not 
engage in this interactional style were looked upon 
negatively by the wider Iranian community.  Thus, 
ultimately, these behaviors had to be altered when 
interacting with Americans because for non-Iranians 
“taroffing” may be an indication of having low self-
esteem, being fake or too modest.  For many  of the 
respondents “taroffing” was culturally  appropriate 
with other Iranians or in Iranian social settings; 
however in public these types of interactions would 
remain hidden. 
Photojournalist: Sasan Afsoosi - safsoosi@gmail.com
The Persian Empire 
The second narrative that emerged was centered on 
the Persian Empire and it was primarily  utilized as a 
means to create distance from the current Iranian 
regime and the controversies surrounding it.  Within 
this narrative, I uncovered two subtopics.  First, the 
history of the Persian Empire and its glories were 
used by second generation Iranians to create cultural 
and regional superiority over other Middle 
Easterners.  The persistent images entailed the history 
of Persia, its mighty kings, and the vastness of the 
Persian Empire.  Thus, the countries that surround 
Iran were argued to provide no match to Iran’s rich 
history or that of the Persian people.  Some of the 
participants seemed to harbor some resentment 
towards Arabs and Saudi Arabia because of the 
invasion that converted the majority  of Iranians from 
Zoroastrianism to Islam.  This resentment was more 
complex when respondents coupled it with feelings of 
moral and cultural superiority  over other Middle 
Easterners, which was frequently contextualized with 
statements about the “uniqueness” of Persians.  
Furthermore, it became clear that there were benefits 
for second generation Iranians to label themselves as 
“Persian” instead of “Iranian.”  First, they  could 
distance themselves from the negative connotations 
of Iran in the western imagination.  For my 
respondents the term “Iran” brought forth images of 
the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iranian hostage 
crisis, the Islamic republic of Iran, the “Axis of Evil” 
speech by  President Bush, and most recently the 
Nuclear Proliferation stand-off between the United 
States and Iran.  In comparison, the term “Persia” 
conjured up images of exoticism, Persian cats and 
carpets, and may sound more “beautiful.”  Second, by 
labeling themselves “Persian” second generation 
Iranians could avoid or at least bypass some of the 
direct discrimination that the “Iranian” label might 
create.  This allowed them to cover their ethnic/
national identities, however the extent to which these 
mechanisms work in escaping marginalization and 
discrimination are questionable and remain to be 
seen, yet they indicate the attempts of my respondents 
to come to terms with their marginality in U.S. 
society.
Race and Whiteness
The third narrative that I uncovered dealt with the 
racial classifications of second generation Iranians 
and their perceptions of whiteness.  The first subtopic
within this narrative explored the struggles that
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second generation immigrants have in their attempts 
to come to terms with their racial and ethnic 
classifications in the United States.  Most of my 
respondents felt that the U.S. Census’ classification of 
Iranians into the white race category was appropriate. 
Most of my respondents saw themselves as racially 
white, but ethnically Iranian.  However, there was 
some confusion about how race is related to 
phenotypic features, such as skin color and eye color. 
Some of the respondents felt that they had a “typical” 
Iranian nose, which they  perceived signaled to 
Americans that they are Middle Easterners and not 
white.  In this regard, Iranians who displayed 
“typical” Middle Eastern or Iranian features such as 
darker hues of skin and “distinct” facial features had 
more difficulties blending in with the mainstream, 
and consequently  stood out compared to other 
Iranians of different  phenotypic features.   The 
interviewees persistently tried to understand the 
official placement of Iranians into the white race 
category, while dealing with their “not quite white” 
status.  
This issue of racial and ethnic classification became 
more complex and multifaceted when the linguistic 
origins of “Iran” were interrogated to show that its 
linguistic roots were tied to “Arya,” which was 
argued to mean “land of the Aryans.”  Throughout 
this argumentation it became obvious that the 
respondents’ desires to be perceived and accepted 
into the white race category were directly  tied to them 
not being perceived as dangerous and irrational 
“Middle Easterners.”  The inherent contradiction is 
that groups, including Iranians, who are seen as 
“potential terrorists” or “Islamic fundamentalists” by 
the mainstream media and the U.S. government are 
simultaneously  categorized as “white.”  This was at 
the heart of the discussions that took place within the 
narrative of race and whiteness.   The extent to which 
second generation Iranians can position themselves as 
racially white is questionable considering the global 
politics that complicate their identities in the United 
States.  These complications have been addressed by 
the scholarship  of Portes and Rumbaut (2001), Ansari 
(1988), and Mostofi (2003), who underscore the 
complexities that pertain to “whiteness” and racial 
classifications for second generation immigrants of 
non-white descent.  In my sample, I found that 
Iranians in the United States aim to classify 
themselves as white due to the positive connotations 
and potential benefits that are associated with the 
white race category.  However, they attempt to do this 
by avoiding ethnic and social associations with other 
Middle Easterners.  Iranians aim to place themselves 
within the white race category without accepting the 
Middle Eastern racial category.  This rejection of 
Middle Eastern groupings creates social distance for 
Iranians from populations that are seen as being 
“dangerous” in American society.
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Conclusion
The narrative themes that were employed by  my 
interviewees were used as a means to counteract the 
negative dominant discourses that are perpetuated 
about Iranians and Middle Easterners in wester n 
societies.  Thus, it  is clear that some participants in 
my interviews utilized the immigrant narrative about 
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[31]
upward mobility  to illustrate their equal standing with 
mainstream Americans, as a way to signal that  the 
Iranian cultural heritage also values independence 
and individualism.  The narratives about the Persian 
Empire and its rich history were critical in positioning 
Iran as a civilized and progressive nation, which was 
viewed as superior to other Middle Eastern nations. 
Lastly, the contradictory narratives about race 
illustrate the subjects’ anxieties about racial 
classification in the United States.  This anxiety was 
heightened when the Middle Eastern classification 
was conceptualized as a racial category, because this 
is the classification that my interviewees attempted to 
distance themselves from, due to the global politics 
that are assigned to it.  In order to achieve this social 
and political distance some participants engaged in a 
discourse about the “Aryan race” and Iran as being 
the true “land of the Aryans.”  Second generation 
Iranians are invested in these narrative themes in 
order to incorporate and belong to American society. 
Iranian-Americans occupy a unique position that is 
situated in the larger context of global politics. 
Therefore, the narratives that this population utilizes 
in understanding their Iranian background while 
attempting to become American is embedded in the 
conflicts and hostilities of the last 30 years between 
the Iranian regime and the United States. 
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Censorship in Iran is greatly pervasive even today, 
which makes it very difficult for Iranians to access a 
wide range of accurate information about everyday 
news. This is an important issue because the media is 
a means of giving a voice to the people. Freedom of 
the press often means unveiling the conduct, errors 
and failures of governments and presidencies. With 
liberty of thought and speech, people share opinions 
and ideas, which can become more powerful than 
arms and can threaten rulers. Freedom of speech is 
also a basic civil right, essential to preserving peace 
and order, and without which it is hard to understand 
and resolve differences of opinion. In this article, I 
examine the situation of the writers, namely  their 
freedom of expression, social and human rights, and 
their experiences with censorship in Iran before and 
after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to 
office. An important part  of my paper will be about 
blogging which has grown extremely quickly  due to 
the fact  that print media can no longer meet the needs 
of writers and readers due to strict censorship and 
extreme punishments for not complying with the law.
Censorship under the current President of Iran, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has put the print media into 
a state of a coma—unconscious and waiting to 
awaken. Iranian journalist Arash Sigarchi, recipient of 
the 2007 Hellman/Hammett award for writers who 
have suffered political persecution, writes in his 
article “Jail for Journalists”: “Toward the end of 
Mohammad Khatami's term (1997-2005) and the 
beginning of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 
administration (2005-present), the Ministry of
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Information and Security, Iran's intelligence ministry, 
began to summon all newspaper journalists to ask 
them to cooperate with the system. Their message 
was clear: Those who cooperate can work; those who 
do not will go to prison. Those who cooperated with 
the regime received economic privileges. Some of my 
former colleagues chose to accept the regime offers 
and today hold positions of power.” (Sigarchi) 
Freedom of expression and association came under 
attack throughout the years as a result of flagrant 
flaws in the administration of justice, coupled with a 
deeply politicized judiciary system, according to 
human rights watchdog organization Amnesty 
International and its 2005 annual report. Journalists 
faced politically motivated and arbitrary  arrest, 
prolonged detention, unfair trials and imprisonment. 
The laws used to arrest and imprison journalists, 
relating to defamation, national security and 
disturbing public opinion, were vaguely  worded and 
at variance with international standards. (Egendorf 
61-62) The human rights watch group also states that 
Taqi Rahmani, Alireza Alijani and Hoda Saber, 
intellectuals and writers associated with the National 
Religious Alliance (Melli Mazhabi), remained 
arbitrarily detained without any prospect of release. 
For over a year, the court  where they had lodged their 
appeal refused to issue a verdict. (Egendorf 62)
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The following cases of journalists’ and writers’ 
experiences of their freedom of expression in Iran, 
reveals the mechanisms through which censorship  is 
exercised in the country. In one of its issues, the 
Economist talks about the closure in 2007 of the daily 
newspaper Shargh by  the Ministry for Culture and 
Islamic Guidance. Shargh published an interview 
with Saghi Ghahreman, a “counter-revolutionary” 
Iranian poet living in Canada, who Iran accuses of 
promoting homosexuality. The Shargh paper had only 
just returned to the streets after being banned in 2006 
for cartooning President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a 
donkey. It was one of a handful of liberal papers to 
have fitfully survived the clampdown that followed 
his election in 2005, which signaled the end of the 
reformist period under his predecessor, Muhammad 
Khatami. Another reformist paper, Ham Mihan, was 
closed in July, shortly after reappearing from a seven-
year ban. Last month Emadoldin Baghi, a former 
editor of Jomhouriat, was jailed for three years for 
"activities against  national security" and "publicity in 
favor of the regime's opponents". (Economist) A court 
last month sentenced Adnan Hassanpour, a journalist 
from the now closed Kurdish-Persian weekly paper, 
to death on charges of endangering national security 
and propaganda against the state. (Economist)  In his 
article “Can Iran Change?” Anderson reveals the sad 
story of Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian 
photojournalist, who was arrested while taking 
pictures outside Evin prison. She died after nearly 
three weeks in custody. Initially, the authorities 
claimed that Kazemi had suffered "a stroke" and an 
"accidental fall." A Defense Ministry  doctor, who 
later fled to Canada, said that he had examined 
Kazemi four days after her arrest, and found that she 
had been raped and beaten; several of her fingernails 
had been pulled out and her skull was fractured. Amid 
an international outcry, an intelligence agent was 
charged with her "quasi-intentional murder." He was 
acquitted when the authorities ruled her death an 
accident. (Anderson) 
During a session of the U.N. General Assembly in 
New York, someone asked about Iran's crackdown on 
academic freedoms and the media, writes Anderson. 
"You see, in Iran, the freedom is a very privileged 
freedom," Ahmadinejad replied. "Just as you'd arrest 
a man for traffic violations, there must be social 
laws. . . . We have to become clean human beings. 
Man has to keep moving along a sublime 
path." (Anderson) Because transgressing the 
censorship laws in Iran can even be fatal, many 
journalists prefer to exercise self-censorship in order 
to avoid facing the harsh repercussions ranging from 
long unemployment to possible death.  This has 
created a situation unique to the Iranian culture of 
censorship. Both social and self-censorship have 
become an extension of physical power, now they 
branch into the realm of controlling the mind and the 
spirit. In this way, censorship plays a crucial role in 
gaining and securing power in Iran.
As in China, where the Internet is having a profound 
impact on political discourse, the Internet in Iran is 
challenging the Islamist regime’s ability  to control 
news and shape public opinion, particularly among 
Iran’s well-educated younger generation. (Berkeley 
71) According to Bill Berkeley, an author and a 
writing professor at Columbia University’s School of 
International and Public Affairs, in his article 
“Bloggers vs. Mullahs: How the Internet Roils Iran” 
the first web-blogs in Farsi were established in 
September 2001.  There are now more than 75,000 
blogs in Farsi with Farsi being the third most 
frequently used language in the blogosphere, behind 
only English and Chinese. (Berkeley 72) The Iranian 
Internet has its roots in the short-lived flowering of an 
independent press in Iran that followed the election of 
the reformist President Mohammed Khatami in 1997. 
Some of the prominent Iranian journalists during that 
time used blogs to bypass strict state censorship and 
to publish their work online. Exiled Iranians 
worldwide use blogs to communicate with those
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still at home in Iran. (Berkeley 72) President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has one too, though he 
almost never posts, explains author Sarah Elton.  Jon 
Lee Anderson in his New Yorker article “Can Iran 
Change?” clarifies, his blog is called Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad's Personal Memos, in which he 
expounds on God, philosophy, and his childhood, and 
answers e-mails from readers. The signature videos 
for his 2005 Presidential campaign were two thirty-
minute productions that expertly portrayed him as a 
man of the people. In one scene, Ahmadinejad is in 
line for lunch at a self-service canteen; in another, he 
walks among the poor.(Anderson )
Unsurprisingly, many Iranians write blogs 
anonymously, yet  some prominent bloggers still write 
under their own names. One is Bijan Safsari, former 
editor and publisher of several pro-democracy 
newspapers that were shut down over the last several 
years. “At a time when our society  is deprived of its 
rightful free means of communication,” he blogged in 
February 2004, “and our newspapers are being closed 
down one by  one—with writers and journalists 
crowding the corners of our jails...the only  realm that 
can safeguard and shoulder the responsibility of free 
speech is the blogosphere.” (Berkeley 72-73) In his 
fascinating new book “We Are Iran: The Persian 
Blogs”, which chronicles the rapid growth of the 
Iranian blogosphere the young Iranian journalist 
Nasrin Alavi quotes one blogger writing in November 
2004, “I keep a weblog so that I can breath in this 
suffocating air.... In a society where one is taken to 
history’s abattoir for the mere crime of thinking, I 
write so as not to be lost in my despair, so that I feel 
that I am somewhere where my calls for justice can 
be uttered.... I write a weblog so that I can shout, cry 
and laugh, and do the things that they  have taken 
away from me in Iran today.” (Berkeley 72)
In recent months, Iran’s blogoshere has faced a new 
setback. Iran now has one of the world's most 
sophisticated Internet censorship systems with filters 
blocking access to all sorts of sites, including an 
Iranian site: hoder.com. All ISP subscribers must sign 
a contract promising not to access "non-Islamic" 
sites, and a bill passed recently restricts access to 
high-speed Internet. (Elton) This is the reason why 
many Iranians who choose to be politically  involved 
in their country, immigrate abroad where they enjoy 
safe freedom of expression but at  the price of being 
away from their homeland and relatives. Hossein 
Derakhshan (of hoder.com), according to Sarah 
Elton’s article “Blogging for a Revolution”, is the 
godfather of the Iranian online democracy movement. 
In Toronto, Derkhshan has a second life as a Web 
designer, with clients in Canada and Europe, but over 
the past two years, he has spent a lot of time overseas, 
conference-hopping and networking with others 
working for online democracy. He credits Canada 
with politicizing him. "If I had not left Iran, I would 
not have discovered blogs and become political," he 
says. "If I were there now, I would have to leave." 
Having already  been detained once, he dares not 
return. (Elton)
Iran has found another important and remarkable way 
to use the Internet. Twitter, with its 140 character 
limit and its cult  of immediacy, has emerged as a key 
source of news and updates from Tehran. (Morozov 
12) Roused by the declaration that Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad had won the presidency in a landslide, 
incredulous voters took to the streets. Using Twitter, 
thousands of Iranians sent micro-messages to the 
outside world, like: “Confirmed. Army moving into 
Tehran agains t protes ters” some with an 
accompanying photo or video link. Twitter’s ad 
slogan “What are you doing?” took on new meaning 
once the Iranian government cracked down on 
protesters and constrained journalists. (America 4) It 
is, indeed, a great shortcut to viewing the photos, 
videos, or text updates from the Iranian streets that 
resurface on our favorite blogs a few hours later. 
(Morozov 12)
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Thousands of Iranian young people may now want to 
experiment with Twitter and see what it has to offer, 
embracing it  as a useful tool to generate and spread 
views critical of regimes like Ahmadinejad’s. 
(Morozov 14)  According to Alec Robinson, the 
author of the ABC News article “Iran powerless to 
stop revolution by proxy”, students in Iran are 
bypassing Iranian censorship  in an effort to preserve 
their basic personal freedoms such as the right to 
assemble. Even though banned, the social networking 
sites such as Twitter and Facebook, can be accessed 
through a proxy  site “where you can view a site 
within the site—hiding what you’re really looking 
at.” (Robinson?) All over Iran, students are using 
these proxy  websites and servers to send images of 
the protests to the outside world and using it to keep 
in touch with one another. The young Iranians also 
use these sites to download illegal Farsi rap, which is 
critical of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
(Robinson)
What seems to be the most interesting aspect of 
contemporary  Iranian politics is the juxtaposition of 
post-revolutionary  dynamics and democratic 
processes generated out of a political stalemate or 
gridlock. (Fahri 169) This inevitably reflects on the 
situation of the print media and the writers in Iran. An 
important event is the so-called press revolution, 
which occurred in the midst of the presidency  of 
Khatami from 1997 to 2005 when for a couple of 
years the journalists and writers got  to taste the true 
freedom of speech. With the election of Mohammad 
Khatami, which itself was a reflection of the highest 
level of elite competition the Islamic Republic had 
seen since its inception, an open press season was set 
loose. In a span of less than one year, the number of 
publications throughout the whole country  reached 
850 (561 of which started between 1997 and 1999). 
The first professional organization pursuing the 
interests of journalists, the Association of Iranian 
Journalists also began operating in the fall of 1997. 
(Fahri 154) Competitive politics influenced the rise of 
competitive press. The interaction of these dynamics 
became highly explosive after Khtami’s election, 
when the Ministry  of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 
now controlled by the pro-reform faction, began 
giving licenses to an increasing number of daily, 
weekly, and monthly  papers throughout the country.
(Fahri 154)  Shortly after Khatami’s assumption of 
the presidency, the Islamic reformers in the press 
managed to establish the Union of Journalists. 
(Afshari 204)
The appearance of the newspaper Jame’eh (Society) 
in 1998 signified a new phase in the struggle for the 
right to freedom of opinion, expression, and the press. 
Jame’eh began with a circulation that exceeded by  far 
those of the semiofficial daily papers, sometimes 
reaching up to 300,000 copies. (Afshari 204-205) The 
daring language of the newspaper was a claim to a 
total independence from the established order. 
Jame’eh opened up a hidden world to a reading 
public thirsting for something more than official 
pronouncements, clerical sermons, and scripted 
rallies in support of the establishment’s domestic and 
foreign policies. It broke taboos and challenged the 
notion of the red lines, the vague no-go areas 
comprising the fundamental political, religious and 
social spheres of the hard-line clerics who dominated 
the system. (Abdo and Lyons 162) “One can criticize 
the decisions of an Islamic government” and still 
remain a good Muslim, a lengthy  interview with a 
leading intellectual cleric assured readers. In the same 
issue, the front page featured a picture of the French 
actress Juliet Binoche, with her hair fully exposed in 
contradiction to Iran’s Islamic dress code. (Abdo and 
Lyons 162) “We did not respect the so-called red lines 
because they were man-made, “recalled Jalaiepour, 
one of the founders of Jame’eh. Jalaiepour soon 
began to keep a packed kit bag, including a 
toothbrush and a change of underwear, at his side in 
case he was hauled off to jail without warning. “Some 
conservatives say that the red lines came from God, 
but we did not believe this. For example, before and 
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Jame’eh you could not see pictures of women on the 
front page…every newspaper put the supreme 
leader’s speeches on the front page, but we used to 
cover it on page two… We were avant-garde for the 
time, but  originally  we just wanted a newspaper to 
protect democracy, tolerance, things like that.” (Abdo 
Lyons 159) Other new, popular publications included 
Sobh-e Emruz (Said Hajjarian’s daily), Rah-e Now 
(Akbar Ganji’s bi-monthly), and Khordad (Abdolla 
Nuri’s daily). (Afshari 205) Even more popular was 
the column written by the witty  Sayyid Ibrahim 
Nabavi, which appeared in Jame’eh, Tous, Neshat, 
Asr-e Azadegan, and Arya. (Afshari 207)
The relative freedom of expression in 1998-2000 
allowed the reformist press to initiate a rational, 
journalistic discourse, implicitly  validating many of 
the charges of violations that almost everyone within 
the regime denied previously. (Afshari 207) The 
terminology  and political analysis, most notably the 
notions of civil society and the rule of law, were 
unleashed on a receptive and restless public. Jame’eh 
newspaper, and its broader promise of grassroots 
democracy, pluralism, and freedom of expression, 
had to be stopped. (Abdo and Lyons 165) Eventually 
the hard-liners used their influence within the 
judiciary  system and other administrative systems to 
revoke the daily paper’s publishing license for 
allegedly undermining religious and revolutionary 
values. (Abdo and Lyons 165) Tous was the successor 
of the banned Jame’eh. In its debut editorial, the 
founder of the newspaper wrote, “Tous seeks to 
safeguard human rights and general freedom, and to 
revive the forth pillar [of democracy].” (Abdo and 
Lyons 165) The newspaper was eventually  shut down 
and its founders, license holder and the popular 
satirical columnist Ebrahim Nabavi were rounded up. 
(Abdo and Lyons 166) 
The attack on Tous revealed the old dynamics at work 
in reference to the freedom of expression and the 
press. The attacks were initiated politically and 
outside of the judicial process by the powerful hard-
liners in the security  network. (Afshari 209) One 
hard-line cleric said publicly the editors faced 
possible death sentences for “fighting against God.” 
This charge, although rarely  applied in practice, was 
among the favorite tactics of the conservative 
establishment, which sought recourse to its own 
reading of Islamic law to crush any hint of dissent. 
(Abdo and Lyons 166-167)  Just a few hours after his 
rhetorical assault on the pro-reform press, Khameini 
convened a meeting… to draw up  arrest warrants for 
the top five people at Jame’eh. (Abdo and Lyons 168)
 
Photojournalist: Sasan Afsoosi - safsoosi@gmail.com
The fact that Khameini did this reveals much about 
the importance all sides place on the issue of free 
expression under the Islamic political system. The 
leader’s intervention also revealed the fundamental 
weakness of the Iranian press and its inability to serve 
as a keystone of a new, civil society within the 
Islamic political system. (Abdo and Lyons 194) Since 
around 2000, the hard-line “conservatives,” as they 
are called, have successfully crushed the reformists, 
not just by shutting down the reformist  press but by 
vetoing reformist legislation and disqualifying 
thousands of electoral candidates, and jailing, 
torturing and in a number of notorious incidents, 
assassinating reformists and student activists. 
(Berkeley 73)
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Brothers Manuchehr and Akbar Mohammadi, and 
Ahmadi Batebi, who were among the young students 
detained, tortured and sentenced after unfair trials 
following student demonstrations in 1999, they 
continued to face violence while in custody. Six years 
after the murders of two political activists and three 
writers—a case known as the “Serial Murders” no 
steps have been taken to bring those who ordered the 
killings to justice. (Egendorf 63) Nasser Zarafshan, a 
human rights defender and the lawyer for the families 
of the two political activists, remained incarcerated 
following an unfair trial in 2002. (Egendorf 64) 
Journalists and human rights defenders Mahboubeh 
Abbasgholizadeh and Omid Me’mariyan were 
arrested for a period of several weeks…possibly in 
connection with their Internet writings and the 
support  they had given to independent non-
governmental organizations. Many of other civil 
society activists faced harassment through summons 
and interrogation. Those detained had “confessed” 
while in custody although later [they] reported to a 
governmental commission that these “confessions” 
were extracted under duress. (Egendorf 64-65)
Though enlightened, elegant, and dapper, President 
Khatami thoroughly  disappointed his supporters. 
Ultimately, he was unable, or as some would say 
unwilling, to implement the reform programs for 
which he was overwhelmingly elected. (Gheissari 
130)  A young student blogger wrote in January  2004 
about Khatami, who time and again failed to stand up 
for student demonstrators who were jailed and beaten 
on his watch: “It’s unfair to say  that he [Khatami] did 
nothing. We got concerts, poetry  readings, carefree 
chats in coffee shops and tight manteaus [the 
mandatory overcoats for women]. But is this all that 
my generation wanted? It was also during this time 
that the students of my generation were labeled 
hooligans and Western lackeys...and again Khatami 
was silent.” (Berkeley 73) 
Iran’s hard-liners wield real power through non-
elective institutions like the judiciary, the so-called 
Guardian Council, which can veto legislation and 
disqualify candidates for elective office, and the 
army, the Revolutionary Guard, and allied militias 
like the Basij and Hezbollah. Any  foreigner who 
visits Iran is struck by the gap between the image 
projected by the regime to the outside world and the 
reality  of Iranian society. The blogs quoted here 
vividly convey the bitter disillusionment many 
Iranians feel not just toward the hard-line mullahs, 
but toward the failed reformist  project and its 
erstwhile leader, Mohammad Khatami. (Berkeley 73) 
Despite the sentiment that Iran is no place to be a 
journalist, gay  or even a woman, I also noticed a 
simmering optimism that change will come one day. 
The point is perhaps best expressed by Emadeddin 
Baghi, a leading journalist and human rights advocate 
who spent three years in prison: “Society itself, not 
the government, creates change,” Baghi wrote “And 
there are deep transformations occurring in Iran. Out 
of sight of much of the world, Iran is inching its way 
towards democracy.” (Berkeley 78) 
Photojournalist: Sasan Afsoosi - safsoosi@gmail.com
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Before the Iranian revolution on 1979, Iran and 
Yemen’s relations were dominated by the Shah’s 
policy toward its regional allies. The Shah supported 
the Yemeni royalists against the republican forces in 
Yemen’s civil war that lasted from 1962 to 1970. At 
the time, there was an Egyptian-backed coup d’état in 
Yemen during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership, 
against royalists backed by  Saudi Arabia. Yemen was 
divided into North and South, but after the war, North 
and South Yemen declared unity in 1990. In 1994, 
another war started between the central government 
in Sana’a and Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), who were 
fighting for the secession of southern Yemen, but 
were defeated. 
Despite Yemen’s military support for Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, bilateral relations were 
not strong during the first two decades of the Iranian 
revolution, but a shift  in Iranian policy toward the 
Arab world resulted in stronger ties with Yemen. In 
recent years, a number of high-level meetings took 
place between the two countries’ officials stressing 
cooperation. One sign of this was seen in 2003, when, 
following Iran’s request for the participation in the 
Arab League as an observer, the Yemeni foreign 
ministry announced it support noting the fraternal 
cooperation between the Arab and Islamic states."2
In 2007, the Yemeni ambassador to Tehran submitted 
Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s message to 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that Tehran-Sana’a relations 
are strong, and was anxious to expand relations with 
Iran. Iranian officials also referred to the friendly 
relations between the two states and called for an 
expansion of mutual ties.3
In May 2009, at a meeting between the country’s 
foreign ministers, Iranian Manouchehr Mottaki told 
his Yemeni counterpart, Ali Muthana Hassan, “The 
Islamic Republic of Iran is always committed to the 
consolidation of its friendship  and deepening of its 
ties with Yemen.”4
Nevertheless, the relationship soured when Yemen 
accused Iran of arming the Shia Houthi militia and 
aiding them in intrastate attacks. In September 2009, 
President Ali Abdallah Saleh revealed in an interview 
with Aljazeera that  Iran had secretly  offered him its 
services as a mediator with the al-Houthi, an 
indication that Iran already had connections with the 
insurgents.5
Tensions increased when armed Yemeni rebels 
engaged in incursions across Saudi border, triggering 
a strong Saudi response. There were accusations of 
Iran’s military and financial support for the Houthis 
though. Yemeni officials also admitted the Houthis 
are financed by several non-governmental Shia 
groups other than the Iranian government.6 In 
October 2009 Yemeni officials seized an Iranian-
crewed vessel containing weapons near the Houthi 
stronghold in the north.7 Still, US official deflected 
claims of evidence of Iran’s military assistance to 
Houthi rebels.8
In March 2007 there was a demonstration in Tehran 
outside the Yemeni embassy protesting the 
"massacre" of Shiites in Yemen. The protesters 
demanded the closure of the embassy and expulsion 
of the ambassador.9
Despite Iran’s awareness of the scope of Saudi 
Arabia’s influence in Yemen, Iran continued to 
expand its presence within the Shia community  in 
that country. Yemen has repeatedly accused Iran of 
attempting to create a Shia state in north Yemen, 
while Iranian officials have blamed the Yemeni 
officials of discriminating against the Shia minority.
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In response, Yemeni officials have cited Iran’s dismal 
human rights record as the reason it should stop 
interfering in Yemeni affairs. An official Yemeni 
response came from Yahya Salih, Yemen’s chief of 
security, who dismissed claims by  Manouchehr 
Mottaki as being baseless. 2
At the height of the rhetorical war, Yemen renamed 
Iran Street in the capital of Sana'a after Neda Agha 
Soltan, who was shot dead during post-election 
demonstrations in Iran. In retaliation, Iranian officials 
have designated a street in Tehran, The Martyrs of 
Sa'ada, after the remote and mountainous Yemeni 
province where Shia insurgents are battling 
government forces. 
According to Saudi-owned al-Arabiyya TV, another 
road in Tehran was recently renamed after Hussein 
Badreddin al-Houthi, a rebel leader killed in the 
fighting. In the past, renaming a street in north Tehran 
to Martyr Khaled Islambuli, the army officer who 
assassinated Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat was a 
serious barrier in Iran-Egypt diplomatic relations.3 4
On November 25 2009, Yemeni demonstrators in 
Sana’a appealed to the government of President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh to sever relations with Iran. Similar 
demonstrations took place in Tehran in support of the 
Houthis.5  
Despite the tension, during a meeting with his 
Egyptian counterpart, Ali Larijani, Iran’s Parliament 
Speaker, criticized Saudi Arabia for its role in 
Yemen’s internal dispute.6 "In Yemen issue, we 
criticized our Saudi brothers not the Yemenis", said 
Larijani in Cairo and reiterated Iran’s readiness to 
resolve the crisis in Yemen.7
The evidence of Iran’s support of the al-Houthi is 
mostly  based on Yemeni government claims, but the 
al-Houthis’ Shia identity  and their ability to fight six 
wars against the government since 2004 suggest  that 
they must have substantial foreign support.
Iran-Saudi Proxy War:
Iran’s ambitions and influence following the Iraq war 
have deepened tensions with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and the Persian Gulf countries, and highlighted the 
old Shia-Sunni divide. These issues point to a shift in 
Iran’s policy  after the Iraq war, and its view that no 
regional enemy poses a serious security threat. 
The Iran and Saudi rivalry are reflected in Yemen. 
Both countries have supported proxies in Iraq, 
Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Iran’s 
support for the minority  Shia who are under attack 
from both Saudi and Yemeni forces does not sit well 
with the Saudis.  But the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
always sought the opportunity to expand presence 
beyond its borders and portray  a strong image, 
especially in the aftermath of the disputed elections 
and the spreading internal turmoil. 
Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have not 
been friendly in the past few years and became more 
antagonistic following the recent clashes in north 
Yemen. The contentious relationship hit new heights 
when Shia rebels crossed over to Saudi Arabia. 
On the Iranian side, several articles in hard-line 
newspapers such as Kayhan and Fars conducted 
interviews with a Houthi spokesman and wrote in 
support of the Yemeni Shia.8 In most news pieces, the 
Saudi army is called the aggressor and the Houthis 
are portrayed as successful defenders of Yemen.9 
The Iranian media outlets, including Press TV, al-
Aalam, Iran’s Arabic language TV station, have been 
taking a pro-al-Houthi position since the beginning of 
the sixth war, which began in August 2009. They 
frequently host Yemeni opposition figures and accuse 
Saudi Arabia of participating in the war in Yemen. 
Most notably, Manouchehr Mottaki warned against 
foreign intervention in Yemen’s internal affairs. “We 
strongly warn the regional countries to be careful and
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vigilant. Certain people add fuel to some crises 
should be assured that the fire will entangle them.” 
said Mr. Mottaki.2
The latest came from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when 
he was addressing the people of the city of Ahwaz 
"Saudi Arabia was expected to mediate in Yemen's 
internal conflict  as an older brother and restore peace 
to the Muslim states, rather than launching military 
strikes and pounding bombs on Muslim civilians in 
the north of Yemen.” Ahmadinejad criticized Riyadh 
for not using “its military weapons against Zionists to 
defend Gazans” during the Israeli 22-day war in Gaza 
in January 2009. In response, the Saudi Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Faisal denied any Saudi 
involvement in military  attacks against the Yemeni 
Shia fighters, "I don't know where he got this 
accusation that the kingdom is waging war on the 
Houthis. The real accusation is that Iran is the one 
that meddles in Yemen's internal affairs." al-Faisal 
said in Riyadh.2
Despite the threat of al-Qaeda to both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, Iran has made connections with al-Qaeda 
when it deemed beneficial. Iran’s connections to al-
Qaeda are to advance its regional goals, hurt 
American interests, and to work against the Saudis. 
The Shia in Iran are not in good terms with the 
Wahabis and several statements from Qom are a 
testimony to that.3 But Iran’s hegemonic foreign 
policy intentions dictate such connections. 
The history of the Islamic Republic and Wahhabism 
has been an unfriendly one. The father of Iran’s 
revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was 
unalterably opposed to Wahhabism and to the House 
of Saud, which adopted that particular strain of 
Sunnism as the state religion of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, 
Khomeini often used the term “Wahhabi” as a 
pejorative in reference to the Saudi ruling family. 
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization has taken 
Wahabism a step further in the direction of 
justification of violence—regardless of the death and 
destruction wreaked on innocent bystanders—to 
inflict harm on real or perceived enemies of Islam. 
Oddly enough, bin Laden and the Islamic Republic 
share a common enemy in the Saudi ruling family—
an enemy against whom they  have been unable to 
make common cause. 
The Shia Factor:
The conflict with the Shia tribesmen has been going 
on for years, but has been more intense since 2004. 
Branded as the home of the bin Laden family, Yemen 
has a religious conflict  between Shia tribes, and pro-
al Qaeda Wahabi Sunnis. The Shia fighters are 
followers of Shia Islamic radical cleric Hussein al-
Houthi. 
In 2005, nearly a thousand troops and tribesmen died 
in a battle near the Saudi border.4 In 2007, Yemen's 
president ordered a crackdown against rebels, 
accusing them of trying to oust his government and 
impose Shia religious law.5 In the same year, the 
Yemeni Ministry of Defense published a fatwa on its 
website authorizing and obligating the use of deadly 
force against the Believing Youth, a small band of 
Shiite Zeydi rebels that has been battling the 
government on and off since 2004.6
The Houthis belong to the Zeydi sect of Shia Islam at 
odds with the predominant version of Shiism 
practiced in Iran known as Twelver Shia, the official 
religion in Iran. In recent years, religious centers in 
Qom have provided fellowships to Zeydis in Yemen 
so they can convert to Twelver Shiism. Shia cleric, 
Hussein al-Houthi, leader of the Houthis who was 
killed in 2004, was known for being close to Qom 
clerics. The relationship between Ayatollah 
Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, to Hussain
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Houthis, was cosidered deep, and almost as friendly as 
the leader’s relationship to Hezbollah’s leader, Seyyed 
Hassan Nasrollah.23
Many Shia web sites and forums have condemned the 
discrimination against the minority in Yemen.2 
Amnesty International’s 2009 report on Yemen showed 
a grim picture of human rights in that country,3 and 
warned that  Yemen’s response to al-Qaeda may cause 
an increase in human rights violations against 
government critics.4 Iran has called for an end to the 
discrimination it claims has been ongoing for years. 
Iran has also accused the Saudis joining the Yemeni 
government in its crackdown on the Shia since August 
2009.5
It is natural for the Iranians to support Shia factions and 
minorities with a history of repression around the 
globe. But the Iranian regime has proved that it only 
supports groups that enhance its sphere of political and 
military influence and authority. The Iranian regime’s 
intentions are more political than emotional. As seen in 
the past, the IRI takes side in political disputes based 
on political alliances. The IRI took the side of Armenia 
over Muslim Azeris and kept quiet in Russia’s 
Chechnya and China’s Uyghur conflicts.  IRI’s support 
for the minority Shia in Saudi’s Eastern Province, 
Bahrain, and Yemen is perceived to have political and 
strategic motives, rather than ideological ones. 
Terrorism:
Recently, the top State Department counter-terrorism 
chief warned that al-Qaeda turning to under-governed 
nations like Yemen and Somalia to plan and conduct 
terrorist operations.6 Yemeni government is also 
troubled by the growing al-Qaeda presence7 8, a weak 
government, and civil conflict. Al-Qaeda’s attempt to 
hide in politically unstable or failing states makes 
Yemen a favorable spot. The closure of the US and 
British embassies sounded the alarm that Yemen is the 
new terrorism hotspot. Despite Yemen’s membership in 
the United Nations, the Arab League, and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-
aligned Movement, the country has had no luck with 
national unity and terrorism.
 The conflict in Yemen has created an internal tension 
between the Sunni central government and the Houthis 
in the north, and sporadic years of insurgency have 
claimed hundreds of lives and ensuing domestic 
conflict and instability and chaos that al-Qaeda needs 
to operate.  The Saudis see a threat on their southern 
border while the Iranians contentedly watch events 
attempting to divert attention from their own 
neighborhood. In a sense, the fight ----------between 
Sana’a and the Houthis has created a security vacuum 
in which al-Qaeda has taken advantage to establish 
itself in Yemen. 
Several strategic elements have caused this conflict to 
find regional dimensions. Al-Qaeda’s presence in 
Yemen, Iran’s presence within the Shia community in 
the north, Saudi Arabia’s historic influence and 
proximity, and US interest to combat terrorism have all 
made Yemen a strategic crossroad. Overall, with both 
the Houthi and the al-Qaeda threat alive in Yemen, 
prospects for national reconciliation are grim. It is 
apparent that insurgency, lawlessness, the cash and 
weapons flow from foreign countries and, declining oil 
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Reconstructions, Reform and Ahmadinejad: 








Iran has for centuries been a territory coveted by 
many and understood by few. The Iranian 
consciousness is one of deep appreciation for its 
national heritage, myths and heroes. Recently  Iran 
has dominated headlines over its nuclear development 
program and created stumbling blocks for world 
leaders attempting to contain and engage an 
aggressive regime in Tehran. Iran today stands on its 
own as a force demanding attention and respect from 
the world. With its massive deposits of natural 
resources and geo-strategic importance, Iran is trying 
to position itself as a regional hegemon and provider 
of energy to countries like Russia and China.  
 Preceding Iran's current place in the world has 
been a journey as dramatic as any  nation in 
contemporary  history. The 1979 Revolution saw the 
birth of a unique and contrarian system of 
government: the Islamic republic. Ever since, Iran has 
struggled to define itself, its goals and its leaders. 
This struggle continues today with the neo-
conservatives of Iran playing power politics not just 
with the reform movement that dominated the late 
1990's and early  2000's but also with a traditional 
conservative party  struggling to stay relevant. Both 
the election of Ahmadinejad and the ascension of 
Iran's neo-conservatives have had repercussions felt 
by all levels of Iranian society. In the following both 
the fall of the reform movement and the electoral 
victories of the neo-cons in 2005 as well as Iran’s turn 
to Russia and China for economic and political 
opportunities will be discussed. First, the origins of 
Iranian neo-conservatives and their experiences in the 
Iran-Iraq war that shaped the movement will be 
reviewed with respect to these developments. 
 Within Iran, neo-conservatives are known 
Osoulgarayan (Principlists) which is a generic term 
covering a range of conservatives. The official name 
of Ahmadinejad’s party  is Abadgaran Iran-e-Islami 
(Developers of Islamic Iran). In academia and within 
the world of political punditry, Iran’s political parties 
are often categorized as either ‘left or ‘right’. This 
oversimplification can cause confusion to foreign 
observers as the simplicity implied by these terms 
don’t do justice to the complexity of Iranian political 
life. The neo-conservative movement in Iran bloomed 
out of the rot of the conservative establishment. 
Conservatives in Iran had lost significant electoral 
ground to the reform movement and its leader 
Mohammad Khatami. A new conservative element 
sought to distance itself from the corrupt, 
establishment elite and be reborn in populist terms 
and they borrowed heavily from the reform 
movement itself. Equality, Islam and nationalism 
were the rhetorical weapons the new conservatives 
would use to advance their agenda. 
 This new movement to break off from the 
failing conservatives would come from the “war 
generation” (Takeyh). Ahmadinejad’s party, for 
exmple, is highly driven by  the revolutionary ideals 
they  embraced under Ayatollah Khomeini and fought 
for during the grueling eight years of war with Iraq 
(1980-1989). Many  members of this new 
conservative movement are veterans of the Iran-Iraq 
war and it is that conflict that gives context to the 
neo-conservative ideology. The eight year war with 
Iraq began in the feverish aftermath of the 1979 
Revolution. Although conscription was used in the 
later years of the conflict, volunteer enlistment made 
up a bulk of Iran’s armed forces. The Iran-Iraq war 
might be viewed as a battle of ideologies in which 
Iranians were called to sacrifice. 
 Saddam Hussein’s secular Ba’athist regime 
promoted pan-Arabism. Iraq and Hussein stood in
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stark contrast  to Iran’s Shi’a brand of theological 
government that was intent  on exporting its 
revolution to all Muslim nations. The war became an 
opportunity to consolidate and legitimize the 
revolutionary  regime and to win the war would serve 
as the ultimate validation of Khomeini’s theocratic 
vision for Iran. Volunteers for the war came largely 
from a deeply religious and poor segment of Iran’s 
society. Upon returning to society, they were 
dismayed at what was seen as a departure of 
revolutionary  ideals and an embrace of Western 
culture by  the wealthier segment of the youth. The 
young and rich of Iran were largely  unaffected by the 
conflict (Takeyh). 
 As the war ended in the late 1980’s, the 
Iranian Republic found itself in a precarious state. 
Although coming out intact, Iran was a deeply 
wounded and traumatized nation. Iranian casualties 
were an estimated 500,000 and the charismatic 
architect of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, died 
the year after the war’s end in 1990. Additionally, 
domestic issues had been largely  sidelined during the 
length of the war. It was time for Iran to focus on 
civil and economic concerns that had been put on 
hold since the 1979 Revolution. The role of leading 
the domestic transition from a state of war to a stable 
nation state would be left to Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
 Rafsanjani reflected a practical conservatism 
that operated within the clerical establishment to 
which he belonged. His strong ties to the mercantile 
elite where he had flourished in the pistachio trade 
provided hi support from some of the wealthier 
segments of Iran. These close ties to the clerical and 
trade classes made him an ideal leader to put the 
pieces back together domestically. Rafsanjani would 
however approach Iran’s economic development by 
doling out state projects through informal and opaque 
dealings where cronyism often trumped merit. This 
along with the lack of government regulation fueled 
an environment of short term thinking and 
opportunism. Foregin investors came to Tehran in the 
hopes of an open economic environment receptive to 
long term investments. The lack of transparency and 
accountability in business dealings would deter 
foreign investment in the long run. It quickly became 
apparent that the rich were getting richer. Ordinary 
Iranians began to resent the growing stratification of 
wealth in their society, however, because of his 
connections with the clerical class and the fact that 
this class often benefited from the economic climate 
encouraged under Rafsanjani, religion was used to 
pacify the population. 
 Into his second term, Rafsanjani would begin 
to lose his clerical support and at the same time, a 
moral liberal reformist movement began to pressure 
Rafsanjani for serious democratic reform. Hardliners 
began to balk at Rafsanjani’s moderate positions and 
as the conservatives fought, the reformers organized 
(Ansari M). A charismatic leader emerged in 
Mohammad Khatami whose service to Iran and 
international experience made him an ideal candidate 
to reach out to the West. Khatami had served in the 
military although his service was under the rule of the 
Shah, not in defense of the revolution. He also ran the 
Islamic Centre in Hamburg and studied Western 
philosophy. Khatami had a pragmatic approach to the 
West that  reflected his experience. In 1997, Khatami 
was elected to the presidency by an overwhelming 
majority of Iranians. He immediately  began to 
formulate strategies to change Iran’s foreign policy 
and reach out to the international community. His 
tactics centered on cultural engagement attempting to 
break the social constructions he saw as ruling 
international relations; particularly the mythology 
surrounding US-Iranian relations (Ansari M, 
Confronting Iran).
 Great strides were made under Khatami in 
opening Iran’s foreign policy and furthering debate 
domestically about the future of Iran. Notions about 
the legitimacy of religious rule were being openly 
questioned and debated. Many began to wonder 
whether the Velayat-e Fqaih was responsible for the
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day to day  business of the state. Scholars like Mohsen 
Kadiver where scrutinizing the constitution and 
calling for evaluation and clarification. However due 
to the large expectations put on reformers and their 
inability to enact substantial, lasting reform the 
movement lost momentum. In 2004, the conservatives 
came back with a vengeance, criticizing Khatami and 
his allies for his strategy of rapprochement with 
nothing to show for it (Ehteshami and Zeiri). A year 
later in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 
presidency of Iran. 
              Ahmadinejad came from humble roots as the 
son of a blacksmith who purportedly sold his house 
giving half the sum to charity and buying a more 
modest house. His family moved to Tehran from the 
small town of Aradan when Ahmadinejad was the age 
of one. His simple beginnings would later come to his 
aid as he fashioned himself a man of the people 
(Ehteshami and Zeiri). As a young man Ahmadinejad 
was a member of the IRGC. His service record 
remains uncertain but it’s been reported that he served 
with the Basiji, one of Iranian paramilitary  security 
forces (Kukis). Ahmadinejad’s experiences as a 
soldier during the Iran-Iraq war might have helped in 
shaping his views of the West. 
              Veterans of the war typically  have a distrust 
of the West that  goes deeper than the standard 
mythologies surrounding the 1953 coup. The 
documents seized from the US embassy during the 
hostage crisis and many other issues were the 
touchstones of anti-Americanism ingrained in Iranian 
society. Veterans of the war were fighting an 
aggressor state that the US tacitly supported. The lack 
of intervention by the US when Iraq illegally used 
chemical weapons against Iran during the war was 
proof to many that the US was bent on destroying the 
Islamist regime. Ahmadinejad is adept  at  invoking the 
past wrongs committed by the West upon Iran to shore 
up domestic support. It’s suggested that a good deal of 
any particular Iranian administrations protestations 
against foreigners and Iran’s foreign policy at large is 
for the consolidation of power domestically (Takeyh). 
Additionally, his refusal to meaningfully negotiate 
with Western powers on Iran’s nuclear development 
has connected with populist sentiments of national 
sovereignty and achievement. 
              Ahmadinejad’s political career has been 
described as unlikely  by pundits of Iranian politics 
(Kukis). In 2004, the 7th Majli’s elections where 
looked at by neo-conservatives like Ahmadinejad as 
an opportunity  to exact their revenge for the sweeping 
electoral wins seen by the reformists in the last 
contests. With the reform movement beginning to 
sputter, conservatives knew they  could not face 
another embarrassing loss. They would go to great 
lengths to prevent this from occuring. The 2004 
elections are largely  described as rigged even by 
Iranian standards. Approximately 3,000 candidates 
were barred from running, including incumbent 
deputies, President Khatami’s brother and a large 
number of reformists. All of these were disqualified 
on the vague accusation that they were “un-Islamic. 
 The seizure of Parliament by the neo-cons can 
be looked at as a turning point in the Iranian political 
landscape. The election of a conservative candidate to 
the presidency didn't come as a huge surprise however 
that the candidate was Ahmadinejad came as a 
surprise to many. Out of eight candidates permitted to 
run, only three stood a real chance in the eyes of 
observers; the conservative Qalibaf, the reformist 
Mostafa Moin and the centrist former President 
Rafsanjani. The conservative vote was split between 
Rafsanjani and Qalibaf. Rafsanjani lacked the 
political support of the Supreme Leader and was 
looked at as corrupt. Still, he was the candidate 
considered most likely to win (Ehteshami and Zeiri). 
As polling began leading up  to the election, hard-line 
leaders decided to switch their support from Qalibaf 
to the trailing Ahmadinejad (Ansari M, Iran Under 
Ahmadinejad). This influx of money and resources
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launched what had been a well-run but limited 
campaign to one of a national contender. The first 
round of voting had the top two candidates; 
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad —in that order. During 
the second round of voting, the reform press now 
without a candidate to support, threw their influence 
behind Rafsanjani. This was problematic because 
they  had been heavily  criticizing Rafsanjani’s insider 
status and alleged corruptness. 
 Ahmadinejad won the 2005 Presidential 
Elections however was met with consternation from 
many Iranians. Opponents and reformist press outlets 
labeled him the “Iranian Taliban” and feared he 
would roll back social reforms made by the two term 
president Khatami (Dehghanpisheh). Although his 
victory marked a huge triumph for the neo-
conservative movement, his tenure as president has 
been less than stellar. Iran’s economy is currently in 
crisis and oil prices have dropped significantly thus 
Iran’s economy has suffered. Iran is plagued with 
high and rising unemployment with inflation being 
reported at near 30% (Aspden). 
Due to the strained relations with the West, Iran has 
looked East for both political and material support. 
Russia and China stepped in to provide the support 
and have used their positions on the United Nations 
Security  Council (UNSC) to protect Iran from 
condemnation by Western powers frustrated with 
Iran’s nuclear progress. 
 In 2006 and 2007, Russia backed the passing 
of sanctions against Iran in regards to its nuclear 
program. However since then it has shielded Iran in 
the UNSC. In October 2009 while addressing Asian 
leaders in Beijing, Putin warned of pursuing further 
sanctions against Iran in regards to Iran’s nuclear 
program. Calling them “premature,” and he offered 
t h a t t h e r e i s , “ n o n e e d t o f r i g h t e n t h e 
Iranians.” (Associated Press, 2009) All is not what it 
seems in Moscow however. A month earlier in 
September 2009, Obama announced the reversal of a 
Bush-era project  to establish a missile defense system 
in Poland, ostensibly being built  to combat Iranian 
medium-range missiles. Russia objected on the 
grounds that it too greatly  affected Russia’s strategic 
security. It is widely speculated that Obama’s 
decision to scrap the defense system was a gamble to 
persuade (or extort) Russia into taking a harder line 
on Iran within the UNSC. (Spiegel, 2009) Obama’s 
gamble appears to have paid off, at least for now. In 
late November of 2009, the International Atomic 
Energy Association (IAEA) passed a resolution on 
Iran’s lack of co-operation in its nuclear program 
referring the matter to the UNSC. The vote passed 
with support from both Russia and China. Russia’s 
positive comments on the possibilities of sanctions 
can be seen as a direct quid pro quo for the US’s 
decision to scrap the missile program. (Cooper & 
Broad, 2009) 
 Chinese-Iranian relations have been positive 
for many decades. Iran and China started coming 
together in the late 1960’s as China became more 
antagonistic towards then Soviet Russia. The Shah 
saw an opportunity as Russia’s support for the 
Communist Tudeh party  within Iran had caused the 
Shah domestic headaches. Trade relations continued 
to increase and normalized diplomatic relations began 
under the Shah in the early  1970’s. The toppling of 
that regime in 1979 would have only  a momentary 
effect on relations. The Chinese government wasted 
no time courting the fresh revolution —apologizing 
for any cooperation with the Shah and recognizing 
the new Islamic Republic of Iran. By the end of the 
1980’s, total trade between the two countries totaled 
$1.627 billion. (Dorraj & Currier, Summer 2008) 
 Iran and China have become linked 
economically  in more dynamic ways than those in 
which Iran had become previously linked with 
Russia, making the situation much more difficult for 
the United States than it had been previously. With 
the growth of China’s middle class, there has been an 
increase in that country's energy consumption. 
Currently, 14% of China’s oil is imported from Iran 
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and that’s just the start. 
China’s state owned China National Petroleum Corp., 
over the last year and a half, has signed multiple deals 
to develop  Iran’s oil fields. These deals to date total 
an estimated $120 billion dollars. (Walt, 2009) With 
most contracts throughout the Middle East owned by 
Western companies, it represented an opportunity to 
establish lucrative contracts, guaranteed energy for its 
ever increasing population and opening up  new 
markets for Chinese goods. China is now Iran’s top 
trading partner, importing everything from consumer 
goods, infrastructure supplies and weapons. (Walt, 
2009) China makes no effort  to disguise this growing 
relationship. At a meeting between Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao and an Iranian official in Beijing, Wen 
was quoted as saying, "The Sino-Iran relationship  has 
witnessed rapid development, as the two countries' 
leaders have had frequent exchanges, and cooperation 
i n t r a d e a n d e n e r g y  h a s w i d e n e d a n d 
deepened," (Xiang, 2009) These energy  deals could 
have huge consequences for nuclear negotiations with 
Tehran. As China invests more into Iran and seeks 
ever greater oil supplies from Iran, it  will give Iran a 
boldness to demand more from China on its behalf. 
Sanctions that involve withdrawing business 
investments or boycotting Iranian oil could be 
damaging enough to China that they  would, in fact, 
need to veto the measure in the UNSC. 
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